1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
. 3	MACON DIVISION
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6	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, :
7	: Case No. 5:02-CR-27-CAR VS. :
8	: DECEMBER 16, 2003 : Macon, Georgia
9	DWIGHT D. YORK, DEFENDANT. : 9:30 a.m.
10	PRE-TRIAL HEARING
11	BEFORE THE HONORABLE C. ASHLEY ROYAL
12	UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE, PRESIDING
13	APPEARANCES:
14	FOR THE GOVERNMENT: MS. RICHARD MOULTRIE, AUSA MS. STEPHANIE THACKER, AUSA P.O. BOX 1702
15	MACON, GA 31202-1702
16	FOR THE DEFENDANT: MR. BEN GARLAND, ESQ. MR. MANNY AURORA
17	MR. ADRIAN L. PATRICK, ESQ. MR. BENJAMIN A. DAVIS, ESQ.
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PROCEEDINGS

DECEMBER 16, 2003

THE COURT: Good morning.

COUNSEL: Good morning, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Let me tell you how I want to proceed today. We're going to start out by taking up some of the motions that were filed by the parties in the case. I've read all the motions, and I have read the responses, if there are responses. It appears the defendant has not filed a response to most of these. Some of them I understand, and some of them I have some questions about, so we will address certain of these motions.

After that, we'll talk about how this case is going to be tried, and I will give you the opportunity to ask me any questions about the way I expect the court to run, and I want to make sure that by the time you leave today, you're going to a real good idea about my expectations of what we're going to do in the case.

Now, I understand there are two new attorneys in the case. Mr. Davis.

MR. DAVIS: I'm Ben Davis, yes.

THE COURT: And Mr. Patrick.

MR. PATRICK: Yes, Your Honor. Adrian Patrick.

THE COURT: Thank you. Is Mr. Rubino here?

MR. GARLAND: He is not, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Is he involved in the case or?

MR. GARLAND: He is still counsel of record in the case.

And his status is unclear, and we will report to the Court shortly when we have clear directions about that.

THE COURT: Okay, well, Mr. Garland, are you lead counsel?

MR GARLAND: Your Honor, I would say today in this hearing I can act as lead counsel, but there will be a discussion immediately following this hearing on those subjects, and I will report to the Court.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, you will be the lead counsel for today, and a lead counsel is going to have to be identified for purposes of the trial of the case.

MR GARLAND: Yes, Your Honor. And I will act as lead counsel today, and if there is a change in that, we will report to the court a lead counsel.

THE COURT: All right, very good. Thank you very much. All right, let's start out with the motions filed by the defense in the case. And the first question that I have is about the consolidated pretrial motions that I believe Mr. Patrick and Mr. Davis filed in the case. Those look like standard discovery motions to me; is that correct?

MR. DAVIS: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I would assume that those have already been filed. I haven't gone back to check the record, but I would assume that those been filed in past. Is that right Mr. Garland?

MR. GARLAND: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So is there anything specifically we need to take up? I mean, I assume that you're just trying to perfect the record because you've come into the case and this is your standard practice in doing that. I have also assumed you're not expecting the government to give you all the information that they've already given counsel that's been in the case from beginning; is that correct?

MR. DAVIS: That is correct, Your Honor. I would also like to point out to the court we have a supplemental motion that we filed today needs to heard, a motion to dismiss the indictment for failure to allege a violation of federal law. That we think is a very significant motion that needs to be heard. And I have there's a curtesy copy on your desk.

THE COURT: I see.

MR. DAVIS: I can outline that briefly if the court who would like. Just let me know the Court's procedure.

THE COURT: Well, probably what I prefer to do would be to read it at the break.

MR. DAVIS: Very well, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. The next is the motion to separate and sever counts pursuant to Rule 8A and Rule 14. Now, that was filed by Mr. Rubino. Who's going to handle that? All right, Mr. Aurora.

Now, I have read the motion, and I have read the

response of the government to the motion, and my question about this to you, Mr. Aurora, is the RICO count sufficient -- does it offer sufficient nexus for joining the two other types of counts in this case, the Man Act count and what I'll call the money laundering count?

MR. AURORA: Your Honor, I would agree that under RICO pretty much you can throw a lot of things in there, but there's a Rule 18 and a Rule 14 requirement with regards to the precedent and some type of nexus between the separate counts.

Simply put, generally, you don't take a client that's been charged with something on one day and then charge them with something two months later, and so on and so forth. It's not sort of a garbage pail where you can dump everything in there.

What we're trying to say is simply under the Rule 8, the offenses, even though they're now couched under RICO, and they weren't in the prior indictment, they're basically just going around the end to get around the requirement under Rule 8A, that you have to have the same or similar characteristics in your charges, they have to either be based on the same act or transaction, or the third issue listed in Rule 8, is that they need to be connected with or constitute parts of a common scheme or plan.

Arguably, prong three may be met when you just put it in a oral RICO, but the idea that you're trying to take three instances of structuring with regards to what this case boils down

to -- it's a child molestation type case -- we find it a little bit prejudicial because once all the evidence comes out, I don't think we'll be able to see clearly and correctly whether it relates to the financial issues as regards to the child molestation issues, and we just don't see any connection, and while I understand under RICO it could all -- it could be thrown in there, the court has the ultimate discretion either under Rule 8A or under Rule 14, that there's prejudice out there that we've pointed out in the brief.

THE COURT: All right, so it sounds to me like you agree that there is a difference when you just have these two types of cases joined without a RICO count, compared to this situation where there is a RICO count.

MR. AURORA: Judge, I agree that there is basis for what they've done, however, I disagree with that happening, and I'm asking the court to exercise its discretion. A couple of cases that weren't cited -- if I could just enlighten the Court -- in Mr. Rubino's motion, if I could just put those on the record.

THE COURT: Are they not in the briefs?

MR. AURORA: No, Your Honor. They're just two cases that I found subsequent to that. They're in Mr. Samuel, our partner's law book. I don't know if you have a copy of that. It's <u>U.S. versus Walser</u>, W-A-L-S-E-R, 3 F.3d 380, an Eleventh Circuit 1993 case.

Again, it deals with charges that have to be of similar

character, and they define it specifically what similar character means as nearly corresponding, resembling in many respects, and someone like and having a general likeness.

The <u>Walser</u> case goes on to cite <u>U.S. versus Wilson</u> and <u>U.S. v Moralis</u>, also Eleventh Circuit cases. Again, Judge, the overall precedent that we have says that the charges that they're going to go for against the defendant need to be similar.

RICO, to some extent, allows an exception, but if you look at the RICO cases that the government will cite or the other RICO cases that I've found, they generally deal with this drug trafficking thing, as far as a felon having a gun while he was conducting a drug traffic, or somebody stealing from a bank, and then hiding the notes.

There's never -- I can't say there's never, but I haven't found anything that, says we'll charge you with child molestation, and at the same time, we'll charge you with bank fraud or obstruction. It's just too great a leap.

And while RICO allows it, I don't find any case law that says two completely distinct and separate, different times, different places. For example, the child molestation issues are between Sullivan County, New York to Putnam County, Georgia or Bibb County, Georgia. The second part of the child molestation is Putnam County, Georgia to Orange County, Florida.

The issues with regards to the three structuring counts all deal with Athens-Clarke County, don't even fall in the same --

I mean, obviously it's the Middle District, but in the same geographical area. There's nothing related between those two counts.

And so I ask that -- if we do a thorough search, that you're not going to find anything RICO-wise that is so distinct, separate, and apart; different dates, different times, different locations.

And that's why, while I agree with the fact that RICO can allow multiple crimes to come in, they're almost always related or similar to one another, i.e., the drug transaction or bank type crime.

THE COURT: I understand. Now, let me ask you another question. Let's assume that I was to agree with you.

MR. AURORA: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: What would be the next step? How would we try the case; what would have to be done with the indictment?

MR. AURORA: I think the indictment, Your Honor, by itself is fine. It's 9, 10, and 11 of the substantive structuring counts that could be either whited out or just re-numbered, or I think, they're there was three counts cited in the forfeiture, we could obviously re-number those issues.

With regards to the interplay between counts one and two, where the Man Act and the structuring is, they're separate subparagraphs. We could very easily just take those ou, white them out, or just get on the computer and cut and paste out. I

think it's a very low, you know, inconvenience to the court or to the prosecution to change it and just get a different redacted, change the lettering, and that would be the end of it.

THE COURT: So are you saying that there would have to be two separate trials, one on the money laundering and one on the child molestation charges? Is that what you --

MR. AURORA: There could be two different trials, Your Honor, but if there's a conviction on the child molestation case based on the guidelines, I mean, there's not going to be a second trial at all, you know, in sincerity, I think just is not.

Arguably, there could be state equivalent to this case that's sort of parallel and pending out there. If there's a conviction, that's not going to happen.

So I don't think there's going to be any real inconvenience. I mean, the case boils down to the child molestation. If they can prove it, I think they'll -- that pretty that's pretty much going to end the case.

THE COURT: And so in terms of the RICO violation, you're not saying that would have to be severed from the Man Act violations.

MR. AURORA: There's a separate count that I've put in for the RICO with regards to what the requirements of the RICO are.

THE COURT: I understand that, but I'm talking about in terms of this, this proposition.

Claiming the case law allows that to be defined as an enterprise. I have to go into the second brief to some extent in challenging the deficiencies in the RICO allegation that we've done.

So while I can say you could have basically anything as

because I think they could prove the enterprise issue if you're

MR. AURORA: I'm not saying they have to be severed

So while I can say you could have basically anything as enterprise and charge anything under today's law for RICO, the second question becomes is RICO the appropriate way, or was the first indictment the proper way to go.

THE COURT: Well, I understand your argument on the RICO.

MR. AURORA: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Now, from the government, let me ask you this how is the evidence going to change in this case if I rule in favor of the defendant, the defendant on this motion that we're dealing with now?

MR. MOULTRIE: Your Honor, the counts that are charged in counts 9, 10, and 11 provide the necessary counts that -- well, how should I state this. The statute of limitation for purposes of RICO is five years. Counts 9, 10, and 11 which are the substantiative structuring counts, provide the basis for the RICO counts in the terms of the statute of limitations that apply.

The allegations of transporting children in interstate commerce for unlawful sexual acts, all occurred outside the five-year window for purposes of the RICO count.

So if we were to -- if the court were to grant the

defendant's motion and sever out counts 9, 10, and 11, it would have to also sever out the RICO count as well.

THE COURT: Well, if I'm going to not grant the motion, am I going to have to instruct the jury that they can only consider the evidence related to the enterprise theory as to the money laundering?

MR. MOULTRIE: No, Your Honor, the only purpose of -- you only need one substantive count that falls within the requisite statute of limitations in order to charge a RICO count that involves other counts that do not fall within the five year statute of limitations. The structuring count gives us that.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. MOULTRIE: And I would like to point out, Your Honor, that the defense, as I expected, suggests that the government's decision to charge this RICO count may be punitive. That is not the case. I'd like to provide just a brief context.

We indicted the case on May 8th, 2002, at the time that Mr. York was arrested. We then continued our investigation, however, Mr. York made a decision to enter pleas of guilty, both on the state level and on the federal level. We suspended all investigation of this case at that point.

He entered his pleas of guilty in January of 2003. It was not until May 9th of 2003 that Judge Lawson decided to reject the federal plea agreement, and since that time we have had the re-arm and re-activate our investigative machine, we've had to do

it in a limited period of time, and we've done that, and we re-indicted this case based on those charges that are readily provable on November 20th of 1993.

So this is not an effort by the government to sanction Mr. York for having withdrawn his plea of guilty.

THE COURT: All right, I understand that. Wait a minute. How long is it going to take you to put up your evidence?

MR. MOULTRIE: Your Honor, I'm guessing it will take a solid two weeks to present the government's case in chief. What is a mystery at this point is how long the jury selection process will take. That will have some bearing on how long our case takes.

Of course, Your Honor, part of the equation as well is the extent of the defense's cross examination of the witnesses.

If the detention hearing is any indication, Your Honor, the detention hearing that was held in May of 2002, took two days with just a few very witnesses.

The government only presented one witness, Jalaine Ward, I believe, and the defense presented a few witnesses, but that took two days. So that might give the court some sort of idea of how it might progress in terms of time.

THE COURT: All right, and how long would it take you to present simply the Man Act charges?

MR. MOULTRIE: The Man Act charges, Your Honor, the Man Act charges are going to take about the same amount of time, and

let me explain, Your Honor.

The Man Act charges don't just involve the transport of the children from New York to Georgia and from Georgia to Florida. The elements of that offense are that we have to prove that when the defendant either transported those children or caused those children to be transported in interstate that he did so with the primary purpose or major purpose of continuing to molest them sexually.

Therefore, his conduct in New York and his conduct, both with the federal victims and with the other children and young adults that are listed in the indictment whose conduct involves solely Georgia is all relevant on the issue of what Mr. York's intent was when he caused those federal victims to be transported from New York to Georgia and from Georgia to Florida.

All of those witnesses are going to be testifying, Your Honor. Even if the court elects to sever out the structuring count, the same witnesses who will be testifying on the Man Act offenses are the same witnesses who are going to be testifying as to the structuring counts.

The structuring counts, Your Honor, are not causing this trial to run two weeks. The evidence in that is fairly limited just in terms of number of witnesses that we have to call.

They're the same witnesses that we'll be calling on the Man Act.

And, that is, Your Honor, if I may say, why the government insists that these predicate acts are not just related to the overall

enterprise as the government asserts.

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These predicate acts relate to one another because the primary people, the members of the enterprise, as we allege, the primary people who carry out a lot of the recruitment for the Man Act charges against Mr. York are the same people that carry out the structuring counts.

So they're related to one another, and they're related to the overall enterprise as well. They will not extend the trial more than the Man Act charges will.

THE COURT: All right, now, I want to move to -- well, do you want to respond to that?

MR. AURORA: Yes, please, Your Honor, if I may briefly. Your Honor, I guess I'm a little confused as to what the statute of limitations issue as far as the structuring counts has to do with anything because if you look at the structuring counts, they range from 1998 through 2000.

And if we simply look at <u>United States versus Italliano</u>, I-T-A-L-I-A-N-O, 894 F.2d 1280 from the Eleventh Circuit, 1990, as soon as this indictment comes down everything is tolled. So typically with RICO it's the last predicate act, plus five years. We're still within the first five years all together at this point, assuming the trial goes forward on January 5th, but if nothing else, at this point it's tolled when this second indictment was filed.

So even if you sever it, it doesn't prejudice the state

in any way -- or the government in any way, shape, or form. So I'm a little confused as to what the point of that argument was. So I don't think that's a valid consideration for the court.

I simply ask, if we just look at the RICO issues, regardless of what the child molestation parts are, if you look at RICO cases, it's got to have some nexus between the different types of counts, and I just don't think it's simply a dumpster where you can charge everything in there, and I don't think there's cases that necessarily say that.

And that is why we're asking that those three counts plus parts of counts one and two just be edited out. I think that will be easier, clearer, less issues to deal with on appeal if there is a conviction, and I think that's just the proper way to go because this case pretty much is a child molestation case.

THE COURT: All right, thank you very much.

MR. MOULTRIE: Your Honor, may I make just one addition to that, please.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. MOULTRIE: Or excuse me, two. One is, with all due respect, Mr. Aurora is just wrong on the law when it comes to RICO. The RICO law, as it stands both in the United States Supreme Court and before the Eleventh Circuit, is clearly that the government may prove RICO counts by showing that the predicate acts relate to the overall purpose of the conspiracy even when they do not relate to one another.

In this case we meet both those standards, the RICO -the predicate acts, excuse me, relate both to the enterprise and
they also relate to one another. So on both those fronts the
defense loses if that is its argument for suppressing the
indictment.

Second, Your Honor, Mr. Aurora, made the proposition that if the court were to sever these counts, that most likely it would not be necessary to try the structuring counts. We absolutely plan to try the structuring counts, first.

Second, it is not correct that we know that Mr. York will be found guilty of the Man Act violations. So for either of those reasons there is no certainty based on the court's decision to sever the counts as to whether or not Mr. York will actually stand trial on the structuring counts. We plan to try those counts one way or the other, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Let's go to the defendant's motion to suppress. My understanding is that what's at issue here is a journal, a quilt, a video tape, and some adult pornography. Are those the four items; is that correct?

MR. AURORA: Yes, Your Honor, and I would put an "s" after the video tapes. There's several video tapes in question that were seized. I haven't looked at all of those, but I've pretty much contained everything to the main structure that was known as Dr. York's house, or however it was referred to in the search warrant.

We haven't gone into the financial issues because counsel has ben able to show me the subpoenas where they got the independent financial records. So the items that were seized financial wise from the house we haven't extended it to because they got it through an independent basis.

So we're just going to limit it to those sexual items. There's a pillow, quilts, videotapes, and magazines, and things like that we listed.

THE COURT: As a very practical matter, do you plan to introduce any or all of these?

MR. MOULTRIE: Yes, Your Honor, we do plan to -- and I think there's also -- excuse me, Your Honor -- I believe there's also Pink Panther doll, is that right?

MR. AURORA: Yes.

MR. MOULTRIE: -- with a dildo attached or something like that. One of the witnesses, Your Honor -- well, most of the witnesses testify that Mr. York used as part of his grooming process the display of adult pornography. So we will be moving to enter the adult pornographic videotapes that we've located, into evidence to corroborate the witnesses' testimony in that respect.

Additionally, Your Honor, one of the witnesses discusses in a statement that Mr. York showed the witness a cartoon pornographic videotape which the witness has identified. We do plan to play the segment in that videotape that the witness recognizes.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. MOULTRIE: The quilt and the pillows were part of the area of Mr. York's bedroom that the witnesses who will testify say that -- and specifically, Your Honor, in particular, the pillows -- that Mr. York used those pillows in New York, he used them in Georgia, and that very often he would commit the unlawful sexual acts with the children on those very pillows.

THE COURT: All right, what about the journal.

MR. MOULTRIE: And, Your Honor, the Pink Panther doll, excuse me, is one of the items, it's a very explicit doll, it's a very large doll, with a very large attachment, and several of the witnesses identified that Pink Panther doll, and we plan to use that in evidence, again, as corroborative evidence. And then there's a journal?

THE COURT: Right, the journal.

MR. MOULTRIE: Excuse me, Your Honor.

MR. AURORA: Could I just list the items, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes, I tried to --

MR. MOULTRIE: Your Honor, I don't recall the journal.

MR. AURORA: There's a journal "slash" letters. I had a pretty lengthy argument. I'm sure you've already taken that.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. AURORA: -- so I won't go over that. There were journals and letters listed in Paragraph 25, 57, and some other paragraphs that I cited. There's a quilt and a pillow. There's

some furniture. It was specifically listed as the black table, figurines, things like that.

There were several videos I referenced to many paragraphs in there. There was some clothing to include grass skirts, amongst other things that I mentioned. There's photographs, and then sexual items, like a fake penis, and some other things are mentioned in some of the paragraphs that I listed in my argument.

And, Judge, I understand what they're trying to say.

I'm not getting into the relevance of any of these items. The whole argument was based on the staleness issue as to the last time any of the people had last seen these items were as late as ten years prior.

So, I mean, I understand the felony part they're trying to make, but I'm making sure, you know, on the record that we stay focused on the ball as far as the dates, the times, and the reliability of the people actually giving this information. That was our basis.

THE COURT: I understand that, and I also wanted to make sure I knew -- I think I was a little bit confused because it talks about on page two, talks about the search warrant based on interviews, and there are only four items that are mentioned in the -- apparently in the search warrant. So I was thinking there were only four items at issue here, but obviously there's a good many more than that.

MR. AURORA: Judge, I mean, I understand what you're

MR. AURORA: I think there were six total, and I cited there were specific paragraphs that may not have been mentioned in the preamble of the search warrant, just to be clear as far as what.

THE COURT: And if -- the circumstances of these items are different.

MR. AURORA: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Where they were found and so forth, and if they're not to use one of them, I'm not going to rule on that, so that was the purpose of going through it. I wasn't trying to decide on the relevancy of it, I was just trying to decide whether I needed to rule on it or not, and it sounds like I'm going to need to rule on all of this.

Now, I'll tell you, and you can respond to this, my thought about these items, so many of them is that these are items that, you know, once you bring these into your home, you don't generally get rid of them. I mean, they are many features in somebody's home that come in there and stay there. I have videotapes. I don't have any pornographic videotapes, but I have videotapes, they've been in my house for years, they stay in the same place they've been in the whole time. I have blankets and pillows and they stay on the bed, and these are the kind of items that once they come into a house, unlike food, for example, they stay there. And so what is your response to that.

saying when we're looking at it as a nuclear family type of situation and not the facts with regards to this case, specifically. Plus, you're also looking at over a period of about 12 plus years of at least three different residences. You've also got testimony directly in the search warrant that I cited in excruciating detail where people are saying they saw evidence being destroyed, they didn't see some of these things in the last four or five years.

The standard under the law that I cited is simply, are those items fungible, moveable, is there a likelihood that they'll stay there. We gave some examples of some things that would stay there. For example, a computer. Your hard drive stays there, even if you delete it, you can expect reasonably to find those things.

Dolls, videos, over a 12 year period of time, nobody giving any specificity as to when they last saw it. There've been multiple moves throughout across state lines. Witnesses have said that we've seen these things being destroyed. Witnesses have said our client said, you know, if there's something coming, I mean, I'm going to go ahead and destroy everything. Witnesses have said that they knew he'd done this regularly.

Those are the kinds of things that I'm going to put out there to show that it's not an absolute that those items would be there. Certainly the law doesn't require an absolute, but there's got to be a reasonable probability that you would find something

from 12 years ago. He had three or four different houses where this person is going across state lines.

And while your argument is correct, Your Honor, as far as saying that I would keep these or you and I may keep these, this isn't -- it's not that objective necessarily. It's more, if you look at the situation here, when the warrant was issued based on the background of the client and the history, is it based on their history a reasonable probability to find these things that much down the line.

And that's what I'm saying, whereas you and I may arguably keep a videotape of our kid from 20 years ago or a movie I bought from Block Buster or something, I don't think it falls in the same category when you look at all the facts and circumstances here.

So is it a reasonable probability that these items would be found with regards to this client based on all that has been said, and I don't think it is, and there's the statements.

THE COURT: All right, I understand your argument. Thank you. Mr. Moultrie, have you had the opportunity to see this new motion?

MR. MOULTRIE: I have, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Are there any other motions that I haven't -- well, are there any other new motions. There's some that I haven't covered, because I don't have any questions about those. I didn't cover the motion to suppress the superseding

indictment. I didn't cover the motion to dismiss counts one and two of the superseding indictment. I think I understand all of that.

MR. AURORA: Judge, with regards to the count one and two motion, again, since Mr. Rubino isn't here, there's a couple of facts I just wanted to perfect the record with.

THE COURT: Go right ahead.

MR. AURORA: And the only other thing is, I've talked to Mr. Moultrie about looking for a bill of particulars. I haven't filed that, again, with some of the issues we're having, but I've gone over in detail as to what I want, and I'll put it in writing and get it to the court before the end of the week. I think as grownups we can resolve those issues. A lot of it, from the discovery, I can figure who's where, but I just want to get it pinned down as to who the known conspirators are on some of the counts that are listed out there.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. AURORA: So there's no confusion. Judge, with regards to the dismissal of counts one and two of the superseding indictment, I think Mr. Rubino clearly goes over defining the enterprise. What I wanted to emphasize, and I don't know if it's clear necessarily to the court from the brief itself, is whether the purpose of the enterprise -- the only issue of the RICO is the purpose of the enterprise when you're looking at the two prongs set forth by <u>U.S. versus Starrett</u>, S-T-A-R-E-T-T, 55 F.3d 1525,

Eleventh Circuit case from 1995. Followed also by the Supreme Court case Sedima, S-E-D-I-M-A, versus Imrex, I-M-R-E-X, Corporation, 473 U.S. 479. It's an '85 case.

It basically says -- defines through a pattern of racketeering activity as the defendants' predicate acts as to their relationship to the enterprise charge, which is sort of the relationship prong, and the second prong being the pattern prong; that the predicate acts formed a pattern of some kind.

What I'm trying to establish or make sure that I'm clear on the record, regardless of the brief notwithstanding, is simply the government on paragraph A of page three of the new indictment sort of goes over the purpose of the enterprise. It's a "religious organization" quote, unquote, is what they've called it. And clearly the purpose of the religious organizations of the members isn't to commit child molestation acts or commit structuring acts and things like that.

These are clearly, if we read the indictment, based on the conduct of one person, which would be the defendant as accused of it. They've listed in a lot of those counts, there's conspirators known and unknown, but at the same time, it also says that a lot of people did things under the fear of violence of some sort.

So the issue with regards to count one, which is the conspiracy, is is there truly an agreement to commit some of these acts if we look closely at the way the indictment is structured,

and perhaps I may need to revisit it once I find out specifically who the co-conspirators were. I think I have a pretty good idea, and one of them has got immunity, and the other folks, arguably, if you read throughout the brief and some of the discovery, are claiming that they were threatened with physical force or things like to do what they did in order to bring the children and things of that nature.

So that was sort of the factual part I wanted to make sure that the court got clear, which I wasn't clear from the brief as to the conspiracy agreement.

The second part is the actual RICO count itself which can be done arguably just by one person. If, under <u>U.S. v.</u>

<u>Camble</u>, C-A-M-B-L-E, 706 F.2d 1322, it's a Fifth Circuit opinion,

Your Honor. It talks about whether the defendant is charged with committing the racketeering activity as alleged in the indictment, the defendant's position in the enterprise that therefore allowed him to do it, and, third, the predicate acts, whether they had some effect on the lawful enterprise.

So the issue I'm trying to raise here is this is a religious organization based on the prosecution's own position. The purpose of the enterprise isn't to commit some illegal act, such as the child molestation or not. That isn't necessarily required. But there's got to be some connection with the purpose of the enterprise and some of the acts that have taken place, and I don't know if that was clear, and those are the types of the

things that they're trying to establish, and what we -- yes, sir.

THE COURT: Go ahead, I'm going to wait to ask my questions until you finish, go ahead.

MR. AURORA: Okay. So the conspiracy issue, as I said, is the issue about force, and I think the indictment can answer that question, and I'm asking the court to look at that.

But second is, there's got to be some effect as far as the enterprise goes, or the lawful enterprise. And our position was simply, as Mr. Rubino put in there, based on the case law, is what is the effect of the lawful enterprise as far as the Nuwabians themselves go because the whole organization isn't there for this purpose. One person can do illegal acts, but there's got to be some nexus in furtherance, some relevance, I guess, as far as helping it.

For example, when we look at the cases that are out there and they talked about, you know, people selling drugs or providing drugs to an agency, thereby furthering the profit motive, or people having folks killed, therefore to keep witnesses silent, and things like that to actually further the conspiracy or the goals of the enterprise.

Occasionally there have been cases that deal with where a police department has been listed as the enterprise where different officers were taking bribes or corruption to further their separate agreement within the enterprise, and we're tying to say that based on this indictment and the way it's written is

there's nothing listed out there where these predicate crimes that are charged are actually furthering the Nuwabian cause or their beliefs or anything like that, and that's what I'm trying to be specific.

THE COURT: I thought there was evidence in this case that the defendant used religious metaphors and religious arguments to support his actions related to these children. Is that not correct?

MR. MOULTRIE: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: That's not enough?

MR. AURORA: The religious teachings and the books and things like that are done and the people followed based on those religious teachings. They provided certain things, if we got into a Bible scholarship as to what, you know, people used to do hundreds of years ago as far as scheduling and things like that go.

I don't think that's necessary until it comes -- I don't see how that is furthering the purpose of the Nuwabians as a religious organization because if we talk -- we're sort of getting into evidence to some extent, I mean, the folks that are going to come and testify will say he either made us do this, that we didn't voluntarily do this, as far as I can tell, and the witnesses that we have with regards to some of the children's own family members will say this didn't happen or we would have never allowed these things to happen.

So I guess there's a little bit of an assumption that his belief system or what he may have published in a book, therefore made that one of the purposes of the Nuwabian nation. don't think that's correct.

I don't think there's anything illegal about what the charter of the Nuwabian nation is to be. One person acting within the enterprise itself, but outside the scope of what the enterprise is, I don't think should be allowed. This should be as straight forward as far as the first indictment was, a child molestation type case, and that's what I'm trying to get back to.

I think we're putting smoke and mirrors and clouds and all these fancy terms, and, you know, where it sounds much more sexy than it is. It's simply just a child molestation type case the way it was charged, and I don't think doing these types of ---

THE COURT: Now, isn't there going to be significant evidence in the case that he used this religious organization in order to satisfy his sexual desires, and isn't there going to be evidence that there were people in the organization that thought they might be somehow blessed or somehow benefited or profited or rewarded, and isn't there evidence in the case that the defendant did reward and did punish his followers if they didn't cooperate with him. Isn't all that in this case?

MR. AURORA: Judge, I agree that those are all issues out there, but I'm asking the court to look at what the purpose of the Nuwabian -- we're basically saying he's the sole basis of that

thing. There are hundreds or thousands of followers that go with regards to this, and there are several leaders within the group itself.

It's sort of like the business issues that we have, you know, you see in New York people getting arrested. You can be president of a company or CEO, and you can do things for your own personal benefit that doesn't necessarily further the enterprise of, you know, Tyco Toys or anything else, just like here.

So while there may be evidence that he manipulated things this way or that way to get what he wanted, that still doesn't further the enterprise, the legitimate goals of the enterprise, or it doesn't relate to the legitimate goals of the enterprise.

And I know it's kind of hard for me to explain that, but I'm trying to sort of show that his individual action be charged as individual without wrapping it up into something more dramatic like the RICO issue. What he does doesn't necessarily further the enterprise or connect with the lawful means of the enterprise.

So what you're saying is absolutely correct, and I anticipate that evidence will come with regards to some of the people that did it for benefit whether they, quote, were able to agree to it based on either the pressure he put on them or the false belief that he gave him that, you know, you're going to be rewarded, or something like that, in the afterlife. You know, those are part of the arguments for count one.

Now with count two, how is this furthering the legitimate goals of a lawful enterprise, which everyone agrees that this was a lawful enterprise, one man acting alone, to satisfy whatever alleged actions that they're claiming he's done.

And so I think that's where the difference is. This should be a sole charge against him for what he's done, versus wrapping it up into something a little sexier.

THE COURT: All right, do you want to respond to that?

MR. MOULTRIE: Yes, Your Honor, and I won't take long.

Your Honor, Mr. Aurora's legal position is hard to explain because it's not the appropriate legal position to take based on the facts in this case.

What I would like to make clear, Your Honor, is that this is not an indictment of the entire Nuwabian nation or its group. There are lots of fine people who believe in Mr. York now, there are lots of fine people who believe in him when he was arrested. This indictment is not an indictment of those people or what they believed then or what they believe now.

The RICO count charges Mr. York with conspiring with certain individuals among the Nuwabian nation to commit a criminal enterprise.

So this does not have to do -- that is, this indictment -- doesn't have anything to do with a lot of the legitimate purposes and beliefs and foundations that Mr. York put in place and that a lot of his believers continue to believe.

Mr. Aurora also makes the point, Your Honor, that Mr. York acted alone. Well, that certainly is not born out by the facts, given that two of co-conspirators have already pled guilty to molesting children in state court and one of the co-conspirators has pled guilty in federal court to knowing about the molestation and not reporting it.

So clearly we have individuals who acted, at least they stated in open court and under oath, that they acted of their own volition in certain instances.

And, finally, Your Honor, the idea that the RICO count is somehow only germane to the Man Act charges is a position that the defense will continue to take because it produces a result that they want, and, that is, not to have to face a RICO count at all. And, again, Your Honor, I would state that the law is very clear that if the government can prove that the predicate acts relate to the overall enterprise, then the RICO count should stand.

Additionally, if the government can prove that the predicate acts relate to one another, then the RICO count should stand. And in this case we have predicate acts that relate to the overall purpose of the enterprise, that is, to enrich Mr. York, to provide him a basis, both financially and sexually, with the ability to molest children and that we have these structuring count and the Man Act count in many instances committed by the same individual.

And for all these reasons the court should dismiss the Defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment because the RICO count is based on the necessary predicate acts that form a pattern of racketeering activity. They have nothing to do, again, Your Honor, with the legitimate purposes of the Nuwabian nation. They have everything to do with the illegal intent of Mr. York and some

And the whole point, Your Honor, was to do it in secret so that many of his followers who believe in him and still believe in him wouldn't know about it. And so, again, for all those reasons, Your Honor, we ask that the court dismiss that motion.

of his co-conspirators to commit illegal acts.

THE COURT: All right, Mr. Aurora, do you have something else to offer?

MR. AURORA: Yes, Your Honor. Judge, if you look at page three of the indictment, under the enterprise section, it clearly defines what they're claiming. They're saying — they define the enterprise: That is, a group of individuals associated in fact, the enterprise constituted an ongoing organization whose members functioned as a continuing unit for the common purpose of achieving the objectives of the enterprise. The enterprise was engaged in and affected in interstate commerce.

And it goes on to the next page under paragraph B, Part 4: A further purpose of the enterprise was that Dwight York kept minor victims and their parents and other followers in fear of the enterprise.

And it goes on to talk about the specific sexual things. They're clearly indicting the Nuwabians as a group, as a whole, saying the purpose of that organization was to do these types of things, and it's not the case, and Mr. Moultrie admitted as much. This is simply one man acting out. This is not the purpose of the enterprise, as listed -- as he just argued. In their indictment, they do say that's the purpose of the enterprise as far as the Nuwabians go.

And I guess I'm a little confused, and I think the court is a little confused at this point as to -- I just don't see how this could be a RICO violation with simply his actions outside the scope of what the enterprise was set out to do.

They're claiming that we're not trying to indict the entire Nuwabian nation, but they put in their indictment repeatedly that the Nuwabian's purpose was to do those types of things, and that's not the case.

So I just don't see how that happens. And the fact that a co-defendant pled guilty to a misdemeanor in federal court saying I knew about something, but I didn't report it, doesn't make them a co-conspirator.

The people in state court that took a plea, if I recall correctly, did altered pleas, where they didn't admit any guilt; they just said we didn't want to fact a 10 year or a 30 year mandatory minimum on some of those charges.

So I don't think that's relevant for the court's

consideration. I'm simply saying if the purpose of the enterprise, being the Nuwabians, is to conduct lawful religious or Native American activity, one person acting outside the scope of that charter doesn't allow you to then go into a RICO and drum up the case and go into a lot of the other things.

It's appropriate to do it simply, as a straightforward molestation count, which they've done in counts four, five, six, seven, and eight.

THE COURT: All right, Mr. Moultrie.

MR. MOULTRIE: Your Honor, I just want to add one thing. It might clear up Mr. Aurora's confusion to look at one of most important sentences where the enterprise is defined, and that is on page 3, the last sentence of paragraph subsection A, which reads, where the enterprise is defined:

The Nuwabians were a religious organization that consisted of approximately five thousand members, including, but not limited to, Dwight York and unindicted co-conspirators and others, both known and unknown to the grand jury.

That sentence makes it very clear, Your Honor, that we are talking about very specific people only.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, very much. Now, in the interest of time, let's take up this matter of the motion to dismiss the indictment, count six and count two, racketeering act, three, transporting minors in interstate commerce for unlawful sexual activity, and failure to allege violation of federal law.

MR. DAVIS: May I, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Certainly, go right ahead.

MR. DAVIS: Your Honor, for the record I'm Benjamin Davis. I'm representing Mr. Dwight York in this case.

Count six and count two of RICO act three, purports to set forth a violation of U.S.C. 2423, Subsection A, and identical language as follows:

In or about April of 1993 in the Middle District of Georgia and elsewhere within this jurisdiction of this court, the Defendant Dwight York knowingly transported and caused to be transported P-23, an individual who had not attained the age of 18 years, in interstate commerce from Kings County, New York to Bibb County, Georgia and Putnam County, Georgia with the intent that such minor engage in unlawful sexual activity for which a person can be charged with a criminal offense, including, but not limited to violations of Georgia Code, Section 1664 and 1665, the individuals not having reached the age of 25, in accordance with Title 18, United States Code, Section 3283, all in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2423(a) and (2).

Title 18, United States Code, Section 2422(a) -2423(a), subsection A, states in pertinent part as follows: A
person knowingly -- a person who knowingly transports an
individual who has not attained the age of 18 years in interstate
commerce with the intent that the individual engage in sexual
activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal

offense shall be found under this Title and imprisoned for not more than 15 years. Therefore, pursuant to the terms of 2423(a) it is a violation of federal law to transport a person under 18 with the intent to engage in sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense.

The criminal offense that the government purports to have been committed by this defendant is a violation of Georgia state law, namely, child molestation pursuant to O.C.G.A. Section 1664, and enticing a child for indecent purposes, pursuant to O.C.G.A. 16-6-5.

Therefore, applying the government's legal theory of the case as set forth in counts six and two, RICO act three, to the statutory language of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2423(a), before this defendant can be accused of violating the terms of the federal statute, he must have also violated the 1993 versions of O.C.G.A. 1664 and 1665.

In accordance with the factual allegation set forth on page 17 of the indictment, paragraph 37 and paragraph 38, in April of the year 1993, P-23 was 14 years of age.

This is significant as O.C.G.A. 1664 did not make it a violation of Georgia law in 1993 to do any immoral or indecent act to, or in the presence of, or with a child who was age 14, but rather, the child had to be under the age of 14. Nor did 1665 make it a violation of the law to solicit, entice, or take any child age 14 to any place whatsoever for the purpose of child

molestation or indecent acts, but rather, the child had to be under the age of 14.

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O.C.G.A. 16-6-4 and 16-6-5 were not amended to include a child of the age of 14 until 1995. The effective date was July 1, 1995.

The dicta of the Georgia Supreme Court case of <u>Feagin v.</u>

<u>The State</u>, 268 Georgia 272, 1997, lends credence to this argument,

to wit: Effective July 1, 1995 it was illegal to have sex with a

person under the age of 16 to whom the accused was not married.

However, prior to July 1, 1995, the conduct was illegal if one of the parties was under the age of 14.

Thus, the government has not adequately set forth a violation of federal law in counts six and count two, RICO Act III, accordingly, these counts should be dismissed.

THE COURT: Do you have any federal cases on this?

MR. DAVIS: I'm sorry, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Do you have any federal cases supporting your position?

MR. DAVIS: Any federal cases, Your Honor? Your Honor, I don't think that any federal case would speak to the Georgia law. I think it's relevant that the Georgia Supreme Court spoke to it. So I think that this it would be a gap in federal law which should be addressed in state law.

The elements of these violations is that in 1993, the defendant committed a violation of Georgia law, 16-6-4 and 16-6-5,

but in 1993, it was not a violation to do these acts with a person that was 14. That happened after 1995.

Now, as the law stands, if you engage in these acts with someone under 16, it's a violation of the law, however, in 1993, it was not.

THE COURT: All right, I understand.

MR. DAVIS: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Moultrie, let me just tell you, I'm going to give you the opportunity to do a written response to this.

MR. MOULTRIE: Your Honor, it may not be necessary.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MOULTRIE: But let me address the court, and I can maybe clear it up. Mr. Davis is right, Your Honor, that if the government cannot show that the victims in 1993 were under the age of 14, that the counts that relates to those particular elements would have to be dismissed.

However, the victim that Mr. Davis speaks of was under 14 at the time that she was caused to travel in interstate commerce from New York to Georgia. That was in 1993. The person that he is talking about, again, was under 14. She was actually 13 at that time.

Second, with respect to the offenses that occurred in 1996, the other set of charges in which the government accuses Mr. York of having caused children to be transported from Georgia to Florida, in 1996, in those charges, Your Honor, the age of consent

would have had to be 16 and under. In those counts, all of the victims were under 16 when they were caused to be transported from Georgia to Florida.

So in both sets of crimes, both the crimes in 1993, when the law was the age 14 or under, and in 1996, when the law was age 16 and under, all of the government's victims meet those tests in O.C.G.A. 16-6-4 and 16-6-5

THE COURT: So you agree with the legal theory, you just say the facts don't support that.

MR. MOULTRIE: Yes.

MR. DAVIS: May I go very briefly, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Sure, go right ahead.

MR. DAVIS: Your Honor, on page 17, I'm relying on the facts that the government sets out in the indictment, and I'll just very quickly cite to the -- or recite to the court paragraph 37:

On or about November 20, 1993, Dwight York, at his private residence in Putnam County forced P-25 and -- P-23 and P-25, both approximately age 14, to engage together with him in oral and -- I'll leave out the other part -- but sex.

But the point is the indictment sets forth that this alleged victim is 14.

THE COURT: Well, it says approximately 14.

MR. MOULTRIE: Well, Your Honor, it says approximately
14, but Mr. Davis is also citing to a place in the indictment that

deals with conduct in Georgia after that victim had already been transported, which is a federal crime.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I would assume that if the evidence doesn't establish what Mr. Moultrie expects it to establish, I will have to dismiss that count against him; is that correct, Mr. Moultrie?

MR. MOULTRIE: Yes, Your Honor, but the facts don't bear his argument out.

THE COURT: Well, I understand that, but I'm saying, my point is, I'm not sure I need to rule on this right now, if I'm clear, if it's --

MR. MOULTRIE: Your Honor --

THE COURT: -- or I can deny it right now and find out what the evidence is going to be, and we can take it up at that time.

MR. MOULTRIE: Certainly. Well, Your Honor, if you like -- excuse me, Mr. Davis -- if you'd like, Your Honor, I'd be happy to provide the court with a very quick response that identifies the individual involved, the birth date of that individual, and the date in which she traveled in order to establish her age at the time of the act.

THE COURT: Please do that.

MR. DAVIS: Your Honor, with all due respect, I'm moving to dismiss the indictment per the allegations as they are set forth in the indictment. I think Mr. Moultrie is referring to

something that's outside the indictment.

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Moultrie just explained that what you're quoting from the indictment doesn't apply under your theory of the law.

MR. MOULTRIE: Your Honor, I think maybe what Mr. -- I think what Mr. Davis is focusing on, Your Honor, or not focusing on, is with the law with respect to the Man Act and these charges concerns the intent of the defendant when he causes a child to be transported.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. MOULTRIE: The act doesn't have to be consummated at the point that the individual travels. It's just the intent has to be to engage in unlawful sexual activity.

When this child traveled, she was age 13, and we will be able to prove that at that time Mr. York had already committed acts that prove his intent to transport her for the purpose of unlawful sexual activity.

MR. DAVIS: He's basically agreeing with me. He's talking about the Man Act; I'm talking about the way it's alleged. For the Man Act to apply, it has to be a violation of a criminal offense.

They allege the violation of the criminal offense was in 1993, and it was a violation of 16-64 and 16-6-5. Per their own indictment, P-23 was 14, therefore, he couldn't have violated a criminal offense as set forth in the indictment, and I'll just

stand on those arguments, Your Honor. 1 THE COURT: Okay. 2 MR. DAVIS: All right, thank you. 3 THE COURT: I want you to submit something to me. Can 4 5 you get it to me by the end of the week? 6 MR. MOULTRIE: I'll get it to you by the end of the day. 7 THE COURT: Okay, very good. 8 MR. MOULTRIE: Your Honor, let me be clear, is it sufficient as I spelled it out what I plan to do, and that is, to 9 provide the factual basis for the charge as it relates to this 10 particular victim? 11 THE COURT: Well, I think so, but, you know, the issue 12 13 is, according to the defense in this case, relates specifically to 14 the indictment and not outside that. So you might address that 15 too, if you would, please. 16 MR. MOULTRIE: Okay. THE COURT: All right, now, those are all the motions 17 18 from the defense that I know about. MR. PATRICK: Your Honor --19 THE COURT: Sir? 20 I do have two other motions. I filed a 21 MR. PATRICK: motion to dismiss the superseding indictment based upon the grand 22 jury being selected from the same pool. 23 THE COURT: Right, and I told you we weren't going to 24 25 take that up.

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MR. PATRICK: Okay, we're not going to hear it at all? THE COURT: Well, 90 percent of the motions that are disposed in this case or ruled on in this case are ruled on without oral argument. And when I go through, and I read these motions, and I feel like that based on what I've read and the response from the other side, then that's -- I don't feel I have to -- I'm not like maybe the judges you're used to who have oral

MR. PATRICK: Oh, I see what you're saying. You're saying you're saying you're not going to have oral argument on the motion.

arguments on every motion. That's just not the way I do it.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. PATRICK: All right, that's fine. Well, I had two I filed this morning, I have two bases for my motion to dismiss the superseding indictment. I filed one this morning, and I provided the court a copy. Are you basically saying you'll rule on both?

There's two motions to dismiss the indictment, Your Honor, just two different bases. One is based on the tainted grand jury pool, and the other is based on the fact of the publicity around the guilty pleas.

THE COURT: Okay, now, I have the motion to dismiss --MR. PATRICK: -- the superseding indictment, and I've provided a copy of the motion to dismiss the indictment and the alternative motion --

THE COURT: Well, just bring me what you have, and let me

make sure I have everything, because --

MR. PATRICK: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay, motion to dismiss the indictment and the alternative motion to change venue. All right, I have not seen that one.

MR. PATRICK: Right.

THE COURT: Why don't you, if you would, just outline that for me.

MR. PATRICK: Okay. Your Honor, on the motion to dismiss the indictment and the alternative motion to change venue, basically, Your Honor, what I'm setting out in this motion is that on — obviously the court is aware on January 23rd, the defendant entered a guilty plea. That plea was publicized in most every media, definitely in the immediate media and the media throughout the country.

Your Honor, I have a supporting exhibit I can submit to the court, articles I pulled off the internet and other articles that we have, I'll submit as an exhibit to support my argument.

But, Your Honor, the case that I'm using to support my argument is <u>United States versus Lynn</u>, 212 F. Supplement Second 541, a 2002 case. This is the case of Mr. Lynn and him being involved with the Taliban organization and Ali Quida.

Basically, Your Honor, the motion I have is based upon the amount of pretrial publicity that this case has had. In the cases that I've cited, U.S. v Abbott and Redu versus Louisiana and

Channel v Florida, all of these cases involve, although they did not grant a dismissal of the indictment, Your Honor, they involve cases with substantial pretrial publicity, and the issue came up as to whether or not the indictment should be dismissed because of the prejudicial impact of the pretrial publicity, and basically the court outlined some rules.

Basically -- and all of the courts agreed in all the cases -- that the Sixth Amendment guarantees that in all criminal prosecutions the defendant shall enjoy the right to a trial by an impartial jury. However, that may be compromised by the presence of pervasive and inflammatory pretrial publicity.

The purpose of me submitting my exhibit is to show the pervasiveness of the pretrial publicity and that it's inflammatory, and I think the court noted in a previous order that dealt with the Middle District that the publicity was prejudicial and inflammatory.

Your Honor, in these cases it was stated that it would be the burden of the movant to show the prejudicial pretrial publicity. I think the court has taken, as I stated, some notice of that.

Your Honor, the difference in those cases and this case is that not only was there pretrial publicity prior to an entry of guilty plea, there was substantial pretrial publicity related in that it's continuing pretrial publicity related to the guilty plea, and it is our position that because of that, that the

defendant cannot receive a fair trial because the information is out everywhere.

I have, Your Honor if I may submit my exhibit, I have a letter from an individual in England that saw this. I have downloaded information from the internet. There are over 15,000 hits related to Dr. Malachi York.

Your Honor, it is our position that because of the impact of the publicity related to the guilty plea that the defendant is denied his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial.

And it is our position, Your Honor, that thus the indictment should be dismissed based upon that aggravating factor, not only on just simple pretrial publicity, but the pretrial publicity related to a guilty plea that's evident across all media, radio, print, and on the internet, Your Honor.

Additionally, Your Honor, we ask that -- the additional ground for this motion to dismiss the indictment is the fact that the defense was informed that if Dr. York testifies that the admissions that he gave will be used against him for impeachment purposes.

Additionally, that if the attorneys allow him to testify contrary to the admissions, that also they would be held to be assisting in perjury basically. Your Honor, that would be a denial of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights as additional ground.

So, Your Honor, I will submit my exhibit if the court

and the cases I cited and the rulings in the request that the indictment be dismissed.

a lot of publicity about it, and his followers go out and publish this and make it available to the whole world, and then he withdraws it, we have to dismiss the indictment against him.

MR. PATRICK: Well, Your Honor, I think your position -your contention, may I say, that the followers did this, Your
Honor, it's just the media publicizing this, as I showed you in
the articles.

The followers, Your Honor, had nothing to do with this, and I think that it would be very difficult to prove that, okay, per the followers or Dr. York directed anyone to do anything related to any type of publicity.

Your Honor, if the case was solely that this was generated publicity by the followers, I would understand, Your Honor, but this is just per the pure fact that a guilty plea was publicized by the media as being in court. There's even a video tape, Your Honor, on the internet, the Idaho media -- Idaho, in the media that actually advertises and shows the actual guilty plea.

So it is our position, Your Honor, that because of the high publicity of the case, the media is going to report on everything that goes on in the case.

So I'm not saying that the individuals did it -- whoever did this, Your Honor, it was independent media report, just as I'm sure we have media here today, Your Honor, and because there's a guilty plea involved, that distinguishes that from other cases of this sort, the high publicity in other cases, because what was advertised is that he pled guilty, and the opportunity -- the chances of at least one juror knowing that he pled guilty is great. So it would be our contention that the indictment should be dismissed, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right, thank you very much. Now, are there any other motions that have been filed today that I haven't heard about? I understand that the defense is talking about essentially filing a Daubert motion. Is that correct, Mr. Aurora?

MR. AURORA: Yes, Your Honor. I've gone through that, and I haven't done it yet. This is what I'm getting done, if you can just give me 24 or 48 hours after the hearing, and the reason for the hearing is based on the proffer by the government that simply says that they're going to talk about pervasive nature of the quote-unquote, "child molestation atmosphere."

There's going to be issues as to the ultimate issue type argument and things like that. So I'd like to be able to formulate what it is specifically and pin-point it for the court, as well as the science behind the psychiatry of saying that the climate was there, versus our argument is, let each person come up and say whether it happened or not happened, and let the jury

decide.

And the third point being is -- one of the other Daubert problems that obviously just struck me off the top of my head this morning, and I'm reading it again, is simply I don't see how that's going to be beyond the kin of the average lay person to say if people are coming in here saying that.

So, while I don't have argument, and I've been giving them fair notice of it, I have informed them that I would file something as soon as I can.

THE COURT: Well, let me tell how to focus your argument.

MR. AURORA: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: What I'm interested in, because I've read the affidavit in the case. On the surface of it appears that this man has expert credentials, that's on the surface of it. In terms of Daubert I'm suppose to examine his methodology and the way he arrived at his conclusion. I don't really focus on the conclusions and the opinions that he's actually going to give in the case.

It would appear to me that one of the primary reasons he's going to testify, and I may wrong about this, but one of the primary reasons he's going to testify his opinions are going to be directed towards more or less the modus operandi used by child molesters. Is that correct?

MS. THACKER: That's correct, Your Honor. Mr. Lanning would testify as to the characteristics of child molesters as well

as the victimization and characteristics of the victims, compliant victims, as he terms it.

And Mr. Lanning actually is here today and has flown down from D.C. and is available for voir dire by the defense since we filed our motion three weeks ago in anticipation of this hearing. I recognize the defense hasn't filed a response, but he is here and available to go forward today.

THE COURT: All right, well, the circumstances of this case in my mind involve allegations and evidence of a consistent pattern of child molestation. Based on the evidence as I understand it, there's going to be evidence of a consistent pattern of the way the defendant did this in a number of these cases, a number of these instances, and I do not think that the average juror understands this.

And so I am not ruling on your motion, but I am telling you where I want you focus, and you can bring up anything else you want to. I mean, you can challenge his credentials or whatever you want to do, but I'm just telling you that based on my review of this -- and actually I reviewed it three weeks ago, so it's not a current review -- that was what came to my mind.

MR. AURORA: Yes, sir.

MR. GARLAND: Your Honor, there is pending a separate document filed by Mr. Rubino, that is a motion, it was touched on by Mr. Patrick, and it's a motion to dismiss the indictment based upon outrageous government conduct relating to a pleading filed by

the government.

THE COURT: I reviewed that, and that was one I'm not planning to take up.

MS. THACKER: Your Honor, with respect to Ken Lanning's testimony and his admissibility, the United States would submit that the defense go forward with any questions it would have for Mr. Lanning today, and they could file their motion, or their basis for his testimony being not heard later. He is here and he's available.

THE COURT: What do you say about that, Mr. Aurora?

MR GARLAND: May I respond?

THE COURT: Sure, Mr. Garland.

MR. GARLAND: We would ask for the opportunity to file our objection to focus what we're going to focus our objection on and to have such a hearing, but not today.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I suppose I'm a little bit concerned about having to bring this man back. This is a very awkward situation. When did you file the notice?

MS. THACKER: November 24th, we filed our motion to admit Mr. Lanning's testimony. That it was three weeks ago, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MOULTRIE: Excuse me, and, Your Honor, I'd also like to point out that we're on the eve of trial.

THE COURT: Well, I understand that, I understand that.

And it's not only are we on the eve of trial, it's during the

Christmas holidays.

MR. MOULTRIE: Yes, Your Honor, and New Year's.

MR. GARLAND: Our objection will be fully made. We have not made our full objection yet, Your Honor, and the issue is obviously an extremely important issue that has many facets to it.

The question of the scientific underpinnings, the factual underpinnings of studies that would make that science, are not a simple question for us just to start examining on. As I understand the issue, we will contend this is not based on science in any respect, and I understand the modus operandi theory, but as I understand Daubert, it has to be based upon science.

THE COURT: All right, well, let me --

MR. GARLAND: And I wish to address that and contest it.

THE COURT: All right, well, let me explain to you that Daubert and those cases that follow after Daubert, including <u>Kumo</u>

<u>Tire</u>, basically talk about two categories of witnesses, at least two. One category is scientific type witnesses, and the other category is witnesses based on their experience.

Now, this strikes me as a witness based on experience, and I would refer you, I think it's the case of <u>U.S. versus</u>

Frazier, and in <u>U.S. versus</u> Frazier --

MR. GARLAND: Is that Frazier or Grazier?

THE COURT: Frizzer. I believe I'm getting this right.

In <u>U.S. versus Frazier</u>, it was a rape case, and the defense had an expert who had investigated many rape cases in the past, and the

district court wouldn't let him testify about what he would have expected to find in a rape investigation based on all of his experience, and the Court of Appeals said that the district court committed error under those circumstances because based on his experience, he was authorized to give his opinions about his expectations about what he would have found. So I think that's the case, I --

MR GARLAND: I think I need to focus directly on that, and address that issue with the court.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR GARLAND: Since the court is narrowing it down, and perhaps taking science out of the issue of admissibility, I am -- by your comments, assuming that, it becomes easier for us to focus on this and easier to deal with this issue.

This man is going to have to come to trial, and we could take this up immediately beforehand. It's a very important part of the case and admitting it in extends the case, eliminating it shortens the case. It's an important ruling in this case.

THE COURT: All right, well, we're going to take a break right now, and I'm taking a break right now because I assume that's everything from the defense on motion; is that correct?

MR GARLAND: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay, and we'll take about a 15 minute break, and I'll give some consideration to that.

MR. MOULTRIE: Your Honor, I'd just like to point out, if

I may, as you consider the point, Your Honor, we filed the motion, the motion was suppose to be heard today, and that's why Mr. Lanning is here.

And it just seems to me that in all fairness to Mr.

Lanning, if the defense has questions for him, the defense's questions are going to be based in part on the motion that we've already filed to admit him as an expert. He's been previously admitted as expert in federal court on the very same issue twice before.

And it seems to me, Your Honor, that in all fairness to both the government and to Mr. Lanning that the defense ought to be pressed to move forward because the purpose of today was to address the motions that have been filed.

THE COURT: All right, well, my understanding is that the response on that motion was due yesterday. So, all right, we're going to take a 15 minute break, and when we come back, we're going to take up the motions by the government.

(RECONVENED; ALL PARTIES PRESENT)

THE COURT: Did you get the Frazier case?

MR GARLAND: I did, Your Honor. Part of the dissent was left off my copy.

THE COURT: Part of the what?

MR. GARLAND: The dissent was left off my copy. I got up through page five.

THE COURT: Well, that's because I don't read the

dissent. This is what I want to do about the Daubert motion. I want to you to file -- how long will it take you to get it filed?

MR GARLAND: I think we can have it day after tomorrow.

THE COURT: Okay. And then I'm going to take a look at it. Daubert motions and hearings in my court tend to be very informal, and I basically let the attorneys do whatever they want to do within reason.

Sometimes I just resolve those on the briefs. Sometimes it's necessary to put the expert. Sometimes it's necessary to have countervailing experts.

So it can go from being very simple to very complicated.

Do you have any idea what your intention is in that regard?

MR. GARLAND: Your Honor, if I can discuss it with you a little bit. Reflecting on this case, it would seem to me that the government should put up what they purport they want this man to testify to.

They have referred to it in the brief as a continuum of characteristics, on page two of the brief, paragraph two of their motion to admit the expert testimony of Mr. Lanning. They have referred to the testimony they intend to submit as, quote, "the continuum of characteristics of situational and preferential sex offenders who offend against children and the very stages and methods used to attract and abuse children." And that he would testify to characteristics of compliant victims of sexual abuse.

In order to apply the Daubert test and the provisions of

Rule 702, I think the court probably needs to know specifically what they purport or at least some outline of the actual substance of it.

Now, I could put him up there and ask him about it, or the government could, but -- in accordance with your approach of some degree of informality -- I think we need to know in order to focus it.

Our objection will be, and we will object, under Rule 702, and we will contend under 702 that the essential element that this testimony is not the product of reliable principles and methods, and element three, that the application by the witness of those principles and methods was not reliability done as to the facts of this case.

So it seems to me, your ruling becomes very fact specific as to whether, you know, there's going to be generality testimony, or, as we see the requirements of 702 and by the ruling done in the Frazier case.

The thing that I see in <u>Frazier</u> is that you had a very discrete, able to be analyzed, fact. You go through a crime scene, and you get these things that you can specifically reference.

Here we appear to be going to psychological characteristics which by their very nature are individually different and come in not necessarily any recognized format.

So I think there's factual differentials that we'd want to make.

Now, I do accept the opportunity to file our motion and make it more focused and to reference in detail his prior work, which we have not done. There have been a number of lawyers entering and exiting this case, and the motion responses were being done by Mr. Rubino, and we should have filed and wish to filed some focused response.

THE COURT: All right, well, I'm certainly not going to prohibit you from filing. You can file whatever you want to file. I've asked you to focus it based on my thoughts about this when I read the affidavit, and my understanding about Daubert. But it sounds like what you're saying, though, is -- well, let me -- was there a report done by this expert, and was the report made available to defendants in this case?

MS. THACKER: Your Honor, there's not a report that
Mr. Lanning has done specifically with regard to this case because
he will be submitted as an educational witness with specialized
knowledge to assist the trier of fact rather to opine on any
ultimate conclusion in this case or the mental state of the
defendant; what Mr. Lanning's expertise is with regards to
behavioral characteristics of sex offenders and victims of sex
offenders, not the psychology of this particular defendant.

By way of delineating what it is that Mr. Lanning would testify to, it's detailed both in our motion and as well in the exhaustive attachments thereto.

Mr. Lanning's testimony regarding the continuum of

characteristics of sex offenders as well as the characteristics of compliant victims has been developed over the course of his 30 years of experience in this area and has been set forth in publications well before this case, including as set forth in paragraph two of our motion, Child Molesters, A Behavioral

Analysis for Law Enforcement, which was first published in 1996, and, A Law Enforcement Perspective on the Compliant Child Victim, which was published in 2002.

The behavioral analysis that was first published in 1986 has been updated as recently as 2001. So those, all of those documents set forth in detail what his testimony would be about with regard to the characteristic of offenders and victims, and the defense has that in the motion.

THE COURT: Well, are you proposing, Mr. Garland, that we have a little hearing today, and let him testify about what underlies his methodology and what is the basis for his opinion and expertise?

MR GARLAND: I think what -- I would want that at some point. What -- I do differ a little bit that the motion itself does not really say what he's going to testify to. It makes reference to law enforcement manuals.

So I was trying to get a clearer focus on what it is they are offering the expert to testify to. I'm generally acquainted with having that laid out as a basis of what is expected to be offered.

So what I would like is for the government to make a proffer of what it is they will have this man say. As I understood it from the response just now, that he's going to talk about generalized characteristics, not fact specific in this case.

THE COURT: Well, do have you a problem with doing that?

MR. GARLAND: But I'm not --

THE COURT: Do you have a problem with putting him on the stand, and -- I just want to make sure we're on the same track.

What his ultimate opinions aren't an issue for a Daubert hearing.

It's his methodology and his credentials. So are we in agreement about that?

MR GARLAND: Well, I'm not sure we are because I heard her say that's -- no, Your Honor, we're not. I don't think under the <u>Frazier</u> case that is the way the court focused it. As I read the <u>Frazier</u> case, the court focused it, it says you have to look at this in the context of the facts in the <u>Frazier</u> case.

THE COURT: Well, let me stop you because I was just notified by my law clerk that <u>Frazier</u> was vacated back in September and has been set for in banc rehearing. So we obviously better not put too much credence in that.

MR GARLAND: Then, Your Honor, I do think I need to look into it a little deeper.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR GARLAND: But just to follow up, however <u>Frazier</u> comes out, as I read it, it seems that you take the rules of 702 and do

look at the -- whether the requirements of 702 are met in the factual context. I think that's what it said. At least I read that here.

So I'm not sure that I do agree with you that you only -- if you look at methodology, I think it brings in the facts of this case, because if he has methodologies, those methodologies have to relate to the facts of the case. I think --

THE COURT: Well, let me stop you. Do you have a problem with putting Mr. Lanning on the stand today and let him go over some of this information?

MS. THACKER: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And I'm not talking about right now. I'm talking about 3 o'clock this afternoon, or something like that.

MS. THACKER: Well, Your Honor, I believe Mr. Lanning's flight is at 5:30 this evening out of Macon, however, he is here and available now, but the position of the United States also, with respect to what is required of us, is that our motion and our brief should stand alone, as well as exhaustive attachments thereto.

We filed notice, timely notice on November 24th, as well as our motion to admit Ken Lanning's testimony on November 24th, and set forth both case law as well as all the attachments with regard to his credentials and a summary of what his opinion would be with respect to those publications that the defense could have read.

We have him here today so that they can cross examine him or voir dire him on his credentials, and if we are prepared to go -- we are prepared to go ahead forward with the hearing, but they, having had three weeks, should also be prepared to cross examine him.

THE COURT: Well, all I'm trying to do is to decide if we're going to get anything done about this today or if we're going to have to do it some other time. Now, there's very little time left between now and the time of trial. I'm very reluctant to stop the trial and have a Daubert hearing. I'm also very reluctant to have a Daubert hearing at the end of the day, but we can do that.

I'm trying to find out what the two sides can agree to do today to get this resolved, and if we can't have some resolution of it, then we're going to have to figure some way to do it. So what can we do.

MS. THACKER: Your Honor, he is here and available. His flight is at 5:30. We can put him on with regard to his background and credentials and what he bases his behavioral analysis with regard to sex offenders and victims. We can do that.

THE COURT: All right, is that agreeable with you, Mr. Garland?

MR GARLAND: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay, and then I'll let you file whatever you

want to file, and I'll let you add to the record whatever you want to add to the record, and -- you know, I'm trying accommodate both sides here.

MR GARLAND: Thank you.

THE COURT: And I'm certainly not holding it against you at all that you may be a day or two late trying to get some response in to this.

MR GARLAND: I think this will begin to help focus the issue, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Okay, well, we're not going to take that up right now. We'll figure out a time when we can do it, because I want to deal with these other motions. So now, we anything else from the defendant?

MR GARLAND: Nothing further, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right, let me just ask a question of both sides here. There is a forfeiture count that is somewhere out there in the ether. I'm not sure what the status of that really is now that there has been a reindictment.

That case was actually assigned to Judge Fitzpatrick, if I understand correctly. And my question is does the fact that there has been a reindictment in this situation make any difference about that?

MR. MOULTRIE: No, Your Honor. That's a civil forfeiture matter that's been stayed, I believe, pending the outcome of the criminal case in which there are two forfeiture allegations.

Garland?

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THE COURT: All right, do you agree with that, Mr.

MR GARLAND: Yes, Your Honor, yes, sir.

THE COURT: All right. Okay, now, we're going to deal with the government's motion, and I want to first find out which motions the defense has objected to. There is the motion to restrict dissemination of juror information.

MR. GARLAND: No objection. Wait, let me -- Your Honor, let look at the prayer in the motion.

THE COURT: Well, you don't need to do that now, because I have my own observations about that, and I'm going to make my own motions, so to speak, related to the motion to restructure dissemination of juror information and the motion to partially close the courtroom.

MR. GARLAND: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So I'm going to save those for the end of the discussion of the defendant's motions, and tell you what I'm proposing in this case, and tell you why I'm proposing it, and then give you all the opportunity you need within reason to respond to what I'm proposing in this case.

Now, there's the motion in limine related to evidence about government witnesses, and I think basically this is sort of covered in the Rape Shield law. Do you have any objection to that?

MR. AURORA: Judge, I mean, the motion is fine, and

that's the rule, we're not suppose to go into it unless they go into one of the physical issues or something like that opens the door, so we'll respect that.

THE COURT: Okay, well, I just was not clear about if you thought you had some theory under which you might be able to bring this in. I mean, I understand that there are theories under which evidence of this type can bring be brought in.

MR. AURORA: Yes, sir.

MR GARLAND: May I join, Your Honor, on that?

THE COURT: Sure.

MR GARLAND: I think our position is that we will comply with the law. If the evidence develops a theory where we believe that to go beyond the Rape Shield, an exception to it arises, we would commit to first address that with the court before any mention either in opening or in cross of those issues so that we don't -- and follow such a procedure.

THE COURT: Okay, all right, we don't have to deal with that. Then there's the motion to release the redacted copy of the indictment.

MR GARLAND: No objection, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And then we're going to deal with the motion on the expert testimony. Now, there are a number of orders that the government has requested that I sign to seal their responses. I assume you don't have any problem with that. I haven't signed any of those yet because I wanted to make sure you didn't have

objection to that.

MR GARLAND: No objection, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay, well, I'll sign those today then and that will take care of that. All right, now, other than the motion to restrict dissemination of juror information and the motion to partially close the courtroom, is there anything else the government has that we haven't taken up?

MR. MOULTRIE: Yes, Your Honor, if I could quickly ask the court. Our computer tech person is here, I believe you know him, Milton Hooper, and what we're proposing to use at the courthouse is the sanction program, the computer program that allows us to display trial exhibits using various flat screens.

And Mr. Hooper is here, Your Honor. We wanted him to have him available to talk very briefly about what we're proposing to do in order to expedite the presentation of our evidence.

We're also going to make the sanction program available to the defense, if the defense has any exhibits they'd like to display in that manner. And I think, Your Honor, that that equipment has been used in your courtroom previously.

THE COURT: Well, let me simply say this, and we'll talking about the way I conduct a trial in just a minute, that this would be more appropriately brought up under those circumstances. The way I handle demonstrative evidence is very simple, if you want to present something, and you have the capability to present something, and it's not going to delay the

trial, then all you have to do is submit it to the other side, and if they agree with it, then it comes in. It's not coming into the evidence obviously; it's coming in for use at trial.

If they object to it, then it needs to be brought to my attention, and I will decide. Do y'all understand that? It's really fairly simple.

The same works for you, if you have any kind of demonstrative evidence, anything that you want to use with the jury, then just exchange it, and if there's no problem with it, then it's going to be used as far as I'm concerned.

MR. MOULTRIE: Yes, Your Honor. But the point I was actually making is not the evidence that we intend to present, but rather the method by which we intend to present it. What we're asking the court is for permission to use the computer sanctioned program to display the evidence.

What it will require is for Mr. Hooper to go down in advance and set up the computer equipment in the courtroom, and I think previously the court has used that equipment before, but I wanted to bring it to the court's attention in case the court didn't want us to use that equipment in the courtroom.

THE COURT: Well, do you have an objection to him using that equipment?

MR. GARLAND: No, we look forward to using the equipment.

As I understand it, and my experience has been, that the

government technician who operates that equipment will make

himself equally available to the defense for the purpose of us being able to get our stuff into the computer.

THE COURT: Is that correct?

MR. MOULTRIE: That's correct, Your Honor.

MR GARLAND: So the experience I've had was that -- the gentleman, unfortunately, in the Southern District was killed recently, he was a technician, said to us, and the government said, if you give me exhibits here and things you want to put in, I will put them in. I won't go running over and say something about it until you're ready to use it, and then you have to bring it up to the prosecutor.

THE COURT: All right, that's fine. I will tell you as people this courthouse know I don't like technological problems. I don't like it holding up the trial of my case, and so if you're going to use technology, it better be working.

MR. MOULTRIE: Judge, it will speed up the trial.

THE COURT: Okay, that's fine.

MR. MOULTRIE: And we'll go down in advance to set it up and makes sure it works properly.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. MOULTRIE: The other thing I wanted to add, Your Honor, just in as in abundance of caution, I didn't make this point in any written motion, and that is, when the trial transcript is produced, I'm not sure which court reporter will be assigned to the courtroom, but the Child Victim and Witness Act

requires that the initials of the children be used in all correspondence that may be made public. Now, that probably should have been added as part of my motion to partially closed the courtroom, and I didn't add it.

THE COURT: Do you have an objection to that? Does the defense have an objection?

MR GARLAND: No, Your Honor.

MR. MOULTRIE: Thank you.

about this, that any of these little technicalities such as that and it's a technicality in the sense of how it's going to be handled, not the substance of it, I'm not trying to -- but I would appreciate it if you would get together with defense lawyers and try to work these things out.

I want this trial to move along very smoothly, and I'm going to do what I can to ensure that that happens, and anything that you can do beforehand that would assist in that would be greatly appreciated by the court. Is that understood?

MR. MOULTRIE: Yes, Your Honor.

MR GARLAND: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Anything further before we get into the motions, the last two motions?

MR. MOULTRIE: Yes, Your Honor. I've not received any response from the defense pursuant to a request for reciprocal discovery that I filed very early in this investigation, and I've

also not received any notice of any experts that the defense plans 1 2 to use, and I believe that there may be a 14 day rule on that from 3 the date of trial. So we are fastly approaching that deadline if 4 we haven't approached it already. 5 THE COURT: Do you want to respond? 6 MR. MOULTRIE: Excuse me, Your Honor, if I could just 7 add, my motion was filed for reciprocal discovery on July 11th, 2002. 8 9 THE COURT: What about the reciprocal discovery, Mr. Garland? 10 MR. AURORA: I'll attach that with the Daubert issue with 11 12 our experts as well. So I'll have it all by Thursday afternoon 13 here. 14 THE COURT: Okay. 15 MR. MOULTRIE: Your Honor, I just want to add that the 16 deadline is December 22nd for the notice of experts. THE COURT: Are you going to have an expert in the case? 17 18 MR. AURORA: Perhaps. Well --19 THE COURT: 20 MR. AURORA: Well, I mean, I anticipate it. We've got a few folks. I just need to iron out the details. So I'll give 21 22 notice of it. We may or may not need it, and if we do, I'll let the court know if we're going to call them or not. 23 24 THE COURT: Well, you need to let me know very quickly. MR. AURORA: Yes, sir. 25

THE COURT: All right, because experts have particular problems or legal issues, I guess is a better way to state that, and I want to deal with those issues in a timely fashion. All right?

MR. AURORA: A lot of those experts, Judge, arguably, are just to rebut some of the medical experts that the state has given us notice of. So whether they use that information or not, may or may not make them relevant.

so I'll give notice of those folks and -- then we may or may not call them. I mean, that's why I say perhaps we may use them, we may not. There were a lot of physical examinations done, and we've got pediatric folks that have reviewed all those documents. If they don't go into it, which just goes into the Rape Shield and all that stuff, then all of it become moot. If they do, then they're --

THE COURT: Okay, on the remaining two motions by the defense, I want you to understand my position on this. A motion was filed by the defense in this case to change the venue, and I spent a long time and gave a lot of consideration and put a good bit of work into deciding where this case was going to be tried.

And after doing all that work, after doing some investigation and talking to the people down in the Brunswick area, I concluded that Brunswick was the best place to try the case.

And I was extraordinarily unhappy when I found out that

the Nuwabians had gone down -- the followers of Malachi York had gone down to Brunswick and joined in the parade and had disseminated material, and as far as I'm concerned, have tampered with the jury or attempted in this case to tamper with the jury.

Now, I suspect that if we tried this case starting

January 5th, and this hadn't happened, there would have been only

one newspaper article about this case. That was the newspaper

article that came out in the Brunswick paper after I entered the

order transferring it.

I have someone down there, several people actually, reading the newspaper and checking the media to find out what has actually happened down there. And so there was this one lone article which is all I know about until what happened recently.

And I found out this weekend, this week when I actually went down to the courthouse to become acquainted with it, about a number of people who actually received information, and this information obviously was designed to exculpate Mr. York.

Now, whether Mr. York directed this or not makes no difference to me. It's obviously done by his followers in this case, and it's obviously a situation where I think that it is going to make it more difficult to pick a jury in this case.

I don't how much more difficult it's going to make it, but I think it's going to be somewhat more difficult. I suspected that it would have been very easy to pick a jury in this case. I still believe that the majority of people who are going to be

called to the trial of this case are not going to have heard about any of this.

I am concerned about the jurors, and I'm concerned about the witnesses in the case. And as far as I'm concerned, I'm not at all convinced that the government has gone far enough in their notions related to witnesses and jurors, and I am inclined to believe that more stringent action needs to be taken in this case.

What we have is a case where we have a defendant who is charged with very serious crimes, crimes that involve bodily harm, crimes that involve minors. There's evidence in the case that witnesses have been threatened. There is evidence in the case, based on what I know at this time, that there's been an effort to interfere with the judicial process here by affecting the jury in the case, and I think that it's clear that threats to witnesses could easily become to threats to jurors. And so I am very concerned about what might happen to these jurors.

I think that the evidence submitted by the government in this case, most of which I didn't even know about until I read the information just recently, was not even known to me. Most of the conclusions that I reached about this were based on what I've learned in the last few days.

And so it's very clear in this case that assuming that he's convicted that there's a substantial likelihood of a lengthy sentence. There's also a possibility of a very high monetary award or penalty. There's a forfeiture.

Certainly it has come to my attention on the bench that cases are filed, some of which are simply harassment cases against various people who've had some kind of connection somehow in the judicial process related to either Mr. York or the Nuwabians.

And so I'm very concerned about how witnesses and jurors might be affected in the case. And in anticipation of that, I have thought about the possibility of sequestering the jury, and I still may do that, although I think that the case where the government is going to spend two weeks, and I assume there'll be some significant evidence from the defense in this case, that to sequester this jury would be quite onerous. I may do that yet. I'm really not sure.

Another consideration that I have is an anonymous jury. An anonymous jury would be one in which the only people who would know the names and addresses and informed of the jurors in this case would be the court and the court staff and those people who need to know that information.

I've also considered closing this trial. The possibility of closing the trial to anybody but the media. Certainly the media is invited to attend this trial. I hope the media will come to this trial. The Supreme Court has made it very clear that media nowadays is surrogate of the public in so many ways in terms of what happens.

I understand that there's a First Amendment right that the public has to come to the trial. I understand that there's a

Sixth Amendment right that the defendant has to have a public trial. I also understand that there are circumstances under which both of these rights can be significantly limited, and those circumstances are generally circumstances that involve organized crime one way or another.

We have a RICO enterprise theory in this case. There's certainly a concert of action in this case in my mind related to the organization of efforts to come down to Brunswick. There is a web site. You filed your motion on this change of venue issue and dismissing the indictment as a result of that.

The reality of the situation is so much of what's out there has been put out there on the web site. So I've looked at the material from the web site. I'm familiar with all of that.

And so the circumstances in this case in my mind make it very unusual. If the lawyers had gone down and passed out this material, you know how much trouble you would be in, and you know how wrong that is and how improper that is.

And so the circumstances of this case in my mind require some very unusual action to protect the jurors because I'm afraid that they're going to be intimidated. I'm afraid that they might be offered some kind of reward. I'm not sure exactly what might happen.

But it all comes down to the obstruction of the judicial process. The judicial process is paramount in this case. It has to work according to the way that it normally works, and so as a

consequence of that, I'm thinking about taking some action beyond what is requested by the government in this case.

Now, I'm not going to enter a ruling today. I'm going to give you or anybody else the opportunity to respond with any motions, any evidence, or anything else that you'd like to add in this case.

That needs to be submitted -- let's see -- we have a telephone conference or -- it's a telephone conference on the 30th, and let me see this a minute. I'd like for you to submit whatever you want to submit by December 24th. Is that adequate, Mr. Garland? Is that adequate?

MR GARLAND: That's adequate.

MR. MOULTRIE: Yes, sir.

MR. PATRICK: That's to submit the briefs, Your Honor?

THE COURT: That's to submit anything that you or anybody else wants to submit on this matter, and then I'll rule about that. But I want you understand my concerns about this case, and what I think is just outrageous conduct, inappropriate, and designed to impact this jury pool. Do you have any questions, Mr. Garland?

MR. GARLAND: No, Your Honor. I would agree with your comments that if I had had anything or the defense counsel had anything to do with it, it would be totally improper.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. GARLAND: And I want the court to know that we had no

knowledge of it and learned of it this past weekend.

THE COURT: Right.

MR GARLAND: And we will file an appropriate response concerning the issue of closure. I think our position will be that it has to be a public trial and that exclusion of the public would be too drastic a remedy, so the court knows where we'll be on that.

As it relates to anonymous jury, we would want counsel to know the background of the jurors adequately, but a dissemination of their names in any way, I think is not necessary.

THE COURT: Well, what is your -- what do you mean by background?

MR GARLAND: Well, I do want to know where they live. I want to know, but I would operate under a restriction of not communicating that beyond myself. But I think residences and environment and neighborhood has a way of informing counsel in some respects in making judgments in jury selection. So we would seek that.

THE COURT: Well, based on my review of the cases, it's common to restrict the information related to name, address, and employment, but I'll certainly consider that, and that's something you can bring to the court's attention.

MR GARLAND: Right.

THE COURT: Now, let me mention --

MR. GARLAND: Can you give me just a minute, I'm not sure

I addressed the rest of the --

THE COURT: Okay, well, you don't have to address anything right now. I'm giving you the opportunity to have time to deal with it.

Do you have any questions, Mr. Moultrie, about that? You may not like that either, Mr. Moultrie.

MR. MOULTRIE: I don't.

THE COURT: But --

MR. MOULTRIE: I actually join in the defense with their concern, Your Honor, but what I wanted to -- the point I wanted to make was concerning the motion as it stands for the partial closure of the courtroom.

Mr. Garland in his remarks raised the concern about public not having the opportunity to view the trial, however, I belive the United States Supreme Court has made it clear that the media is the surrogate of the public, and the court has said that if it imposes closure of the courtroom, the media will be present.

That would suffice for the government, and I think it would also meet the concerns of the court, and I would think, frankly, the concerns of the defense team themselves.

It's important that the judicial process be protected in this case, and they apparently are not able to do that with respect to their own efforts, and we certainly cannot do it either, Your Honor, and it may require as the court has just said, go above and beyond what the government has previously asked for

in that respect.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. GARLAND: Your Honor, addressing whether the jury would be sequestered and the length of trial. I'm really unclear about the scope and length of cross examination in this case. I could see that it would very important for rather detailed examinations, Your Honor, not just on the act, but on all the surrounding circumstances leading up to it and other things.

So it does have the potential for the need for examination of a lot of factual details, as well as relationships between the respective parties and their motives. So it is not my intent to say it's going to be extraordinary long, but I think if we have jury selection care, and they're saying two weeks, you would add, I would say, another week to that, in all probability.

THE COURT: All right, so you're predicting it will be a three week trial, is that what I understand?

MR GARLAND: If I'm hearing the government right, they need two weeks to put up the substantiative evidence, and then -- is that correct, Richard? And then you have the issues of argument and jury selection and defense case and perhaps rather detailed examinations of the witnesses, that the two weeks, it might be a little longer.

I have always been wrong on my predictions on the length of trial, so I'd ask the court to put no weight on those predictions. I just see factors here that could bear on it, and I

tend to not favor the sequestration of jurors because of the catharsis it puts them through, however, I recognize in this case there are some special circumstances.

THE COURT: All right, I understand.

MR. MOULTRIE: Your Honor, the government would just like to go on record as saying that it would like a sequestered jury, that it would like the opportunity for individual voir dire questions to be put to the jury panel in a closed courtroom, and that for the other reasons that the government has already stated and stated in written form in its request for the partial closure of the courtroom, that we would also ask that, again, the trial be closed except for the media.

THE COURT: All right.

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MR GARLAND: Just to respond to that, we join in the wanting individual sequestered examination of each juror.

THE COURT: Well, I'm not inclined to do that, so you better have a good reason for doing that, and you better submit something to me on it if that's what you want because I'm not inclined to do that.

MR GARLAND: Would Your Honor share what you are inclined to do where we do have these issues of publicity?

THE COURT: Yes, we're going to talk about that just in a minute. I'm going to tell you how I'm going to proceed in just a minute. I want to make sure that we deal with the motions, and then we'll move forward with that. Anything else related to

government motions?

MR. MOULTRIE: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All the motions have now been covered.

MR. MOULTRIE: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Okay. I want to explain a number of things to you about the way I expect this trial to be conducted, and then I'm going to give you the opportunity to ask me as many questions as you would like to ask.

The first thing that you need to understand is that I am very jealous of the jury's time, and as a consequence of that, I expect you to be prepared on your direct examination and cross examination and arguments and so forth, and any motions that you might want to make during the course of the trial.

This case has been around for a long time, and you've had ample opportunity to know what your case is about and get prepared for it. And so I am expecting you to come out of the starting gate and move to the finish line. And I don't abide a lot of fumbling papers around and asking for extra time and so forth and so on during the trial of the case. Do you understand that? Okay.

MR GARLAND: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So I'm not going to be unrealistic or unreasonable about that, but I am going to push you, and I'm going to tell the jury that I'm going to push you, which is my standard practice. I am not doing anything differently in this case than I

would in any other case, with the exception of what we talked about just a minute ago.

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So this is the standard approach that I use to the trial of a case, and I don't think it makes any difference whether it's a big case or a little case, these same rules apply.

I will tell you, and I note specifically for this case, is we've just had two new attorneys come into the case, and that's fine. I don't have a problem with that. But you told me, Mr. Garland, that you're going to have a meeting this afternoon and decide who is going to be lead counsel.

And what I will tell you is simply this, I'm not going to continue this case because there are two new lawyers in the case, and I'm not going to let anybody out of case, including Mr. Rubino, if it's going to cause this case to be delayed or cause problems in the trial of this case.

So we're moving forward with this case on January the 5th. That's the plan. It's set up for that. An enormous amount of work from my office has gone into that, and that's the way we're going to go unless there's some very, very strong reason for doing it in a different way. So I want you to understand that.

Now, as far as the conduct of the case, I expect there to be lead counsel, and that certainly does not mean that lead counsel has to try the entire case. I don't have any problem with, you know, one attorney taking a witness or one attorney taking a motion, the way we did it today.

Mr. Aurora, you handled a lot of the technical matters, and I don't have any problem with that at all. But we're not going to deal with motions by committee. Only one person can respond or make the motion. And I'm not going to let you consult three or four different lawyers about each time a motion is made you. You understand that. And if you make the motion, then you make it.

Unlike some of my brothers on the bench in the Southern District, I'm not necessarily opposed to side bar conferences, but you can definitely over do that. What I do not like is to take the jury out. I do not like to take the jury out. If you make an objection that I think is a jury argument, I'm going to very firmly cut you off and rebuke you for that.

There are certainly occasions when it's important to approach the bench. Most objections don't require that. So I'm going to expect the objection to be made by one person. I'm not going to say that you can't get a note from somebody else related to that objection, but I'm clearly saying you can't go around get a head count about what the objection ought to constitute.

We're going to move forward with the trial of the case. If we have a bench conference, one person from the defense and one person from the government can come to the bench. We're not going to have everybody coming up. It's very difficult for the court reporter to deal with a situation like that.

There may be occasions when we have to take the jury

out, but I need to understand very clearly why it is that the jury needs to be taken out, and it has been has to be a very good reason. It just takes up too much time.

As far as objections, let me just tell you that I have two rules that may be peculiar to me. One is, as far as leading questions are concerned, those matters that I consider to be preliminary or threshold or foundational, you can lead the witness, and any objection that you make at that point is going to simply be denied. So don't waste my time on those kind of objections.

There are a lot of issues that are really collateral or foundational that really help to move the -- that leading questions help to move the case along. So I tend to be much more lenient with leading questions. However, don't put testimony in your client's mouth or your witness's mouth when you know that it's something that shouldn't be done.

Okay, now, we have very experienced lawyers here. I'm not troubled about that at all. I know you're competent, I feel very comfortable with you. So I have high expectations about the way you're going to conduct yourselves in the trial of this case.

I suspect that you're going to find that I'm fairly easy to deal with as long as I think you are playing by the rules. But when I conclude that you are not, then it's going to be much harder for you to conduct the trial of this case.

So as long as you conduct yourself as ladies and

gentlemen, then I don't think we're going to have any trouble getting along, but I will tell you that there are judges that cross the spectrum of judges who like an uncontrolled courtroom, they like cheap shots and dirty tricks, and then there are other judges who do not like that and don't tolerate that, and I'm one of those.

So you need to keep that in mind. I think professionalism is very important, and I expect you to conduct yourselves in a professional way throughout the trial of this case.

As far as the picking the jury in this case, I haven't -- I've thought about a number of ideas related to how we're going to pick the jury in this case. I will tell you that I'm going to do the voir dire, and I will tell you that the way I typically do the voir dire is that I may have some of my own questions, and I probably will have more than the normal questions in this case.

And what I'd like for you to do is come up with your questions for the jurors and exchange those, and if you have any objection to the other side's questions, then you need to bring those to my attention, and then I'll rule on that, if necessary.

Otherwise, I will ask the questions that you've submitted unless I find for some reason that I think they're inappropriate.

So you understand that, and what I want you to do is to exchange those in time enough so when we have our telephone conference on December 30th that you'll have the opportunity to

bring those objections to my attention.

Now, let me point out to you that the reason we're doing this by telephone is because I assume that you're going to be busy preparing for trial of the case, and so I'm not going to require the defense lawyers to come down here.

If you'd like to do this in chambers, we can do that, but it's primarily in deference to the defense attorneys so you don't have to spend three or four hours trying to get down here and back.

I am concerned about the pretrial publicity in this case. I suspect, as I said earlier, it may not be as -- there may not be as much impact as there possibly could be, primarily because there will be a number of jurors who come from outside of Glynn County.

So anyway, we'll find out what the circumstances are when we start to examine these jurors, and I'll be asking them questions, and I have certain questions that I ask that relate to their ability to serve as fair and impartial jurors in this case which are fairly standard.

So if we a situation which there might be a question about it, then we'll take it up. Sometimes there are matters that come up during voir dire that are personal matters, and I'll let the jurors come up to the bench and tell me about if they might be embarrassed to stand up to something that they might not want the rest of the jurors to hear.

So in that sense, there would be some individual voir dire in those circumstances. If you want to strike a juror for cause, that motion needs to be made at the time we're dealing with the juror and the issue comes up. Do you understand that. All right.

If you have a Batson complaint, that needs to be made before the jury is put in the box. I want you to bring that to my attention before the jury. I am going to do the best I can to ensure that that the jury that tries this case will be fair and impartial and that they can enter the jury box with a clear mind and decide this case based on the evidence and the law that I charge.

So I'm going to do what I need to in order to accomplish that. If it is required to do individual voir dire, then I will do that, but I'm not at all convinced that's required, and I don't know that we'll know that until we ask some preliminary questions of the jurors, but I haven't decided what I'm going to do about that yet. That's on my to-do list.

And so if you have any recommendations or suggestions about that, I'll be glad to hear from you about that.

As far as the opening statements are concerned, the opening statement is an opportunity for you to present an overview of the case. It is not an opportunity for you to argue the case. It is not an opportunity for you to argue the case. It is not an opportunity for the defense to go into some lengthy explanation of the principles of burden of proof and reasonable

doubt and innocence and so forth and so on.

So I want you to outline the case, I will give you reasonable amount of time to do that, and I would like for you to tell me at the beginning of the trial how much time you think you're going to need, and then once you tell me that, I'm going to keep you to it.

Basically the same with the closing arguments. As far as the closing argument is concerned, I tend to be very lenient with closing argument. If you want to use your documentary evidence, whatever, your displays, flip chart, whatever you want use, then that's fine, you can use that as long as -- it's taking up your time, though, and, if you have an hour to do closing argument, and it takes you 15 minutes to fiddle with your equipment, then you're down to 45 minutes. So that's another consideration that is important in my mind.

Now, we will have a charge conference in the case, and I don't think it will last very long in a criminal case, so I don't see that will be a particular problem. You certainly need to submit to me whatever you think will be appropriate under the circumstances, and I'll consider all of that.

And as far as your conduct in the courtroom, or your -let's see your movement around the courtroom, I am not a stickler
for formality. I have a very simple rule. You have to be close
enough to a microphone that the court reporter can hear you, and
the court reporter is going to call you down, if you aren't. It's

not even going to take me; he's going to tell you that he can't hear you.

And so that's going to be the requirement. If you want to stand outside of the podium, I don't have any problems with that. I think it's going to be a little bit difficult for you to pace back and forth because you won't be heard. And so as far as I'm concerned, the conduct or your moving around the courtroom, is controlled by the needs of the court reporter. It's not the formality that I might impose.

If you want to approach the witness, just say, may I approach. You don't have wait for me to say, yes, just move on up. I'm not going to let you do an extensive cross examination of a witness at the witness -- you know, right there in front of the witness. You're going to have to move back away from the witness.

Certainly if there are documents that you have that you want to show the witness to refresh the witness's memory or whatever, then I don't have any problem with you standing there and doing it that way.

I do want you to make sure that there is a witness exhibit notebook. I need an exhibit notebook, the witness needs an exhibit notebook, and you need an exhibit notebook. Do y'all understand that? Because I don't want time to be taken with somebody fumbling around trying to find an exhibit to show the witness. So I want you to get together and agree. There may not be any. I don't know what you are going to have, but I think it's

important in this case for you to be prepared with these witnesses.

I'm going to give you the opportunity to do a thorough and sifting cross examination of the witnesses in this case, but I'm not going to let you be a battering ram. I just don't -- if you don't like the answer you get the first time, I don't let you continue asking the question until you intimidate the witness into answering the way you want it answered. So I want you to be on quard against that.

I will tell you that I have what I call the modified cumulative evidence rule. Modified from Judge Owens's rule. And, that is, my rule is that I'm not going to let you put up a lot of witnesses to testify about the same thing over and over again. I'm not going to restrict you to just one witness, but when the testimony becomes cumulative, that is an appropriate objection for either side to make, and depending on the circumstances, I might restrict the testimony.

So, again, this goes back to what I said at the very beginning about jealously guarding the time of the jurors in this case. Now, is anything I haven't covered or you would like to ask me?

MR GARLAND: What do you think our hours will be and what about break time and that sort of thing.

THE COURT: Well, okay, the trial should start at 9 o'clock. That's generally what I do, and I generally conclude at

5 o'clock, and that's my general practice. Now there are certain circumstances where, for example, if we have a witness on the stand, and that witness is going to take 15 or 20 minutes or 30 or even 45 more minutes, I may ask the jury if they'd like to stay a little bit later. So I am flexible to that. I rarely start before 9 o'clock because a lot of these jurors in federal court have to come from 50 miles away, but I do go beyond the 5 o'clock hour.

MR. GARLAND: Will you have a practice about hearing the counsel before the court cranks up in the morning?

THE COURT: Yes, I'm glad you brought that up. It is my practice to be at courthouse before the trial starts. I will try to be there by 8:30 or so, and I will tell you that if you have a matter that is going to come up in the trial of the case during the course of that day, you need to bring it to my attention that morning before the trial starts.

Or, if you learn about it during the course of the trial, at the break or during the lunch break. And if you bring up something during the trial that requires me to have to take the jury out, and I think you should have brought up before trial, I'm going to be very unhappy about that.

So it is very important to me for you to you bring matters to my attention when the jury is not there, okay, when we're not doing something with the jury. Obviously, there are many objections that come up during the course of a trial that

cannot be anticipated, and I'm not talking about that.

I'm talking about matters that are going to take some discussion. It may be some testimony, it may be some legal research. Something like that that's significant, and you're all good enough attorneys to know what that is. So that is definitely an important point, and I'm glad that you brought that up.

MR. PATRICK: Your Honor, what time is the telephone conference on the 30th?

DEPUTY CLERK: 10 o'clock.

MR. PATRICK: And we'll just provide your assistant with all our --

THE COURT: Right, yes, that would be great if you would do that, we'd appreciate very much.

MR. GARLAND: Your Honor, just on the issue of the individual examination of jurors, and assuming we're going to have some jurors that have heard about this case, assuming that, I urge you to take those in chambers and question them.

I also urge you to consider that type of examination if anyone in their family or friends or someone they're personally connected with has had experiences with allegations of child molestation, either personally as a victim or in the family those. Are so sensitive -- excuse me, yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I agree with you about the child molestation questions, and that's exactly what I had in mind when I said earlier that there are questions related to matters that might

really be embarrassing, and they can come up to the bench, and I think that that would certainly be justified in those situations.

If we have a number of jurors in this case who say they've never heard of Malachi York or the Nuwabians or don't know anything about this case, and that's a significant number from which to pick this jury, I don't know why I need to take them individually, and, say, are you sure you really don't know anything. Do you understand what I mean by that?

MR. GARLAND: I do, Your Honor. I think what you're saying is that can we agree that if they've heard about it, cut them out.

THE COURT: Well, that's one idea I have. At least initially, not -- you know, it may be how many jurors have we got coming, Lee Ann -- we're expecting to have 130 jurors.

MR. GARLAND: I have had the privilege of being in a highly publicized case in that courthouse, and there are very commotive -- seem to be a very adequate place where the judge in our case, Judge Bowen, because of the publicity, did bring jurors in individually, and it was a pretty comfortable and quick process, after he had done his general voir dire.

So I just want to suggest that it is a rather workable procedure and better than the bench and attempt to explore what may be very sensitive matters. And what he did was, we did some weeding, and it would be -- it was a local case where there was massive publicity, and, there was not a change of venue in that

case, but we addressed the issue of the general exclusion. Both sides, I think, in that case agreed, if they had read or heard, or -- well, we were able to exclude some general portion.

THE COURT: Right.

MR GARLAND: But there were others that had heard, but who felt like they could be fair jurors, and though they said they could be fair jurors, they were taken in individually, and in that particular instance, we were given individual follow-ups to explore it.

So I urge that approach as a very workable, not a non workable approach, and one that, given the sensitivities of this case, which there are emotional sensitivities here about child molestation, I think would, in fact, be helpful.

I would also ask the court to consider working out a process where after you -- or when you do your general questions, we can submit to the court follow-up questions on those areas, and then finally, I would ask that you consider after that has been done, allowing us to request the right of individual voir dire on a sensitive point or something where the court could interplay with us after you ask questions that you might say, all right, Mr. Garland, do you have any follow up on that point. I would suggest that approach.

THE COURT: Well, I think we can be flexible about that.

I mean, if we have a hundred jurors who say that they've never heard of Malachi York or the Nuwabians or the trial of this case,

you know, I'm not sure what the question necessarily would need to be, some of them are obvious, then I think that makes a difference. If we only have ten, then that's going to make a big difference too about how we conduct this.

And so what I'm telling you is I haven't got finally decided the approach I intend to use, and I'm also telling you that depending on what I find out when we get there, then there are certainly different arrangements that can be made.

I understand your concerns, and I think we're just going to have to see what this jury pool looks like after we get them in there and what they have to say.

Now, let me make this very clear, if anybody attempts to contact or tamper with or intimidate, or do anything with one of these jurors, and I find out who they are, then they're going to be extraordinary serious consequences to that. So I just want everybody to know that.

MR. GARLAND: Well, Your Honor, I want to be clear on that, and I appreciate the court bringing that up. It is my understanding that no one can contact any of these jurors if their names become known under any circumstance or any neighbor or any friend of these jurors, and it is my understanding that that's the rule of this court.

And it's the intent of counsel to abide that and to have anyone connected with counsel in this case or anyone associated with the defendant abide with that rule.

And I just want the court to know that we will do our best to let anyone who has contact with this case understand that a failure to do that might result in being jailed or being prosecuted criminally.

THE COURT: All right. Anything further other than the matter of the witness?

MR. MOULTRIE: Your Honor, the only point, the final point I wanted to make is, unfortunately one of the factors that may result in the trial being more lengthy that maybe it necessarily has to be is there are a number of chain of custody witnesses, there a number of documents, there a number of non-fungible items, for example, that were seized during the search that absent the court's ruling to suppress them will require a number of FBI witnesses in order to admit each of those documents because of the number of FBI witnesses, for example, that participated in the search.

I am hopeful that we might be able to work out some agreement with the defense to stipulate to some of those chain custody witnesses, I'm trying to do that, and perhaps I'll be successful, perhaps I won't. But I did want the court to know that that is something that the government is trying to work out with the defense.

THE COURT: Well, that needs to be worked out. I mean, it's just that simple. I mean, to have somebody come in here and simply testify that I got it on such and such date from so and so,

and I gave it to such person on another date. I mean, those are the kind of things that you should be able to reach an agreement about, so I want you to work very hard.

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I'm not certainly prohibiting you from requiring something where there's really some kind of dispute, but just to make life difficult on the prosecutor is not a good enough reason to do that, and if there's going to be some kind of issue about that, I'm want to know what it is beforehand.

MR. GARLAND: Certainly, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right, okay. It is now 12:35, I have a telephone conference at 2 o'clock. How long do you think it's going to take to hear from Mr. Lanning?

MS. THACKER: Your Honor, we can do a streamline version of his credentials and what his testimony would be probably in an hour.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, if we come back at 2:30, would that be enough time for him to get to the airport?

COUNSEL STAFF: I'll get him there.

MS. THACKER: Yes, and perhaps I can speak more quickly and do it under an hour at that point.

THE COURT: Well, let's just talk about that a minute.

MS. THACKER: It's the Macon airport.

THE COURT: The Macon airport?

MS. THACKER: Yes, it's just the Macon airport.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, let me just say this. There

appears to be a fairly extensive statement here of his background, that's Exhibit A to the motion, and it talks about his education, it talks about the specialized training he's had, it talks about the other training he's had over the years.

I don't want you covering anything that's in here, okay. So that's going to save a little time right there. You don't need to tell me about the obvious now. I'm not clear about what you're particularly interested in, Mr. Garland.

MR. GARLAND: Certainly, Your Honor, we agree that they can put in for your consideration the written resume from the standpoint of that. I may have cross examination about some aspect of it, or some examination, but I would think that that can go in.

THE COURT: Okay, all right. Mr. Moultrie.

MR. MOULTRIE: Your Honor, I was just talking to co-counsel, as I understand it, I think what we're proposing is to just allow the defense an opportunity to cross examine Mr. Lanning about any concerns they have, any questions they have. We're happy to stand on our motion for purposes of our evidentiary.

THE COURT: Is that okay with you, Mr. Garland?

MR GARLAND: Well, I think the government should be required to proffer some substance to put this in a context what they intend to ask. Summarize it, put in writing, or something, on direct.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GARLAND: So that we can make decisions about, do we cross or what do we cross.

THE COURT: Well, sometimes I do the examinations of these witnesses in these Daubert hearings. So I am not sure we have an agreement yet about what we're going to do.

MR. GARLAND: Well, I would ask that the government make a proffer of what they intend to put in front of the jury from this man. Not I've written a zillion articles or I work for the FBI and I work for the government, but what they're going to put him up to say, okay, now, here is what I propose to testify as quote "expert."

THE COURT: Okay, well, I think that the issue in my mind is how his expertise and methodology fits into this case. That's what I think the issue is.

MR. MOULTRIE: And, Your Honor, there are some cases that deal with Mr. Lanning as a witness that are directly on point on that issue. I've got copies. I'll give them to defense counsel.

What defense counsel seems to be suggesting is that they want us to do is exactly what the court said Mr. Lanning cannot do, and that is make specific findings in terms of the specific facts of a particular case as to the ultimate issue of whether, for example, Mr. York is a pedophile or is a preferential sex offender. That is not what we plan to do with him, and the cases say that we can't.

THE COURT: Well, I don't think I would let you do that

anyway.

MR. MOULTRIE: And that's --

THE COURT: Is that what you're worried about?

MR. GARLAND: I'm trying to find out what they are going to do.

MR. MOULTRIE: Well, Your Honor, that's why we filed the motion three weeks ago, but I'll give them cases that we have.

MR. GARLAND: Your Honor, actually in all deference to the government counsel, the language in the motion, it doesn't clearly tell me.

THE COURT: Okay, well, we're beyond that. I'm not worried about that. I want to find out -- I don't anticipate that this is going to take a long time as far as the proffer is concerned. I think you understand what I want to hear.

MS. THACKER: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And then I'll give you the opportunity to ask whatever you want to ask as long as it's within reason. Now, I don't, again, my understanding is that the ultimate opinions are not really the issue I have to deal with.

And obviously, it's also very clear from the Daubert line of cases that in most situations the way to deal with this is by cross examination of the witness, rather than just throwing in stuff, you know, you not letting him testify on --

MR GARLAND: The courts have come down many different ways on this and on these type of issues, and some of this

testimony I notice was done pre-Daubert, I think, and perhaps some afterwards, so I want to see exactly what it is.

But I think it does address itself to the court's discretion of how you'll handle it, and its value versus it prejudice is always there, even in this.

THE COURT: Well, that's a separate matter, I think, but maybe that's -- if you need to point that to me, that's fine. I'm the gatekeeper. I decide whether the gate comes open or not, so --

MR. GARLAND: Right.

THE COURT: It's based on the methodology and expertise.

I'll be glad for you to educate me further on Daubert. Anything

further before we come back at 2:30?

MR. GARLAND: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

(RECONVENED; ALL PARTIES PRESENT)

THE COURT: All right, let me just mention one thing before we get into this expert issue that I meant to tell you this morning. My current plan is not to start the evidence in this case until Tuesday.

So you don't have to worry about having witnesses there. But I will tell you, however, that if we have time, I do want you to do the opening statements. So, come prepared to do that, and then if it works out that we can't pick this jury in a day, we'll just go from there. All right. Okay, now, Mr. Lanning, do you

want to come on up.

DEPUTY CLERK: Raise your right hand, please. Do you solemnly swear that your testimony in this case will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

THE WITNESS: I do.

DEPUTY CLERK: State your name for the record, please.

THE WITNESS: My name is Kenneth Lanning, L-A-N-N-I-N-G.

THE COURT: Now, Mr. Lanning, this is a Daubert hearing, and I'm pretty sure you were in here the entire time that we talked about this in the courtroom; is that correct?

THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right, well, what I'd like for you to do is to tell us how it is that the opinions that you're going to offer in the trial of this case will assist the jury to understand the evidence or to determine a fact at issue. Can you do that?

THE WITNESS: Yes. It is my understanding that I'm not going to offer any opinions. What I'm going to do is to educate the jury concerning certain patterns of behavior that I have become aware of as a result of my training, education, and experience.

THE COURT: All right, and tell us about those patterns.

THE WITNESS: Basically I have been asked to talk about two primary patterns. One is patterns of -- offender patterns of behavior. The different kinds of sex offenders against children behave in different kinds of ways, and it's important for people

to understand what those different patterns are, and then to also understand, depending on how the child was victimized, who victimized them, what the relationship is, that children will also respond in different kinds of ways and have different kinds of patterns.

THE COURT: All right, well, give us some examples of that.

THE WITNESS: Okay. Most people, I would say the average person, when you talk about a child molester, predominantly thinks about a stranger who comes from outside, who kidnaps children, and forces them against their will to engage in sexual activity, and that certainly happens and gets a lot of publicity, but that's not the most common type of child molester.

And many people take that model or their understanding of that and try to apply it to all kinds of different cases that come along. So you may have a case of a female child who has been sexually molested by her father from the age of two or three on up into her teenage years, you may have an adolescent boy who has been befriended and seduced by his Boy Scout leader or Little League coach in a different kind of a way. That offender is an acquaintance. He's not a family member. He's not a stranger.

So we have different kinds of offenders behaving in different ways with different kinds of victims depending on the dynamics and the type of case.

THE COURT: And what is it about this case that enables

you to be able to assist the jury in understanding the issues of the case, the facts of the case?

THE WITNESS: Well, I actually know very little about this case. I'm not really going to talk about this case. I'm going to talk about different patterns of behavior that I've seen with different kinds of sex offenders against children and different patterns that I've seen in children who have been victimized.

THE COURT: Okay, well, I'm trying to understand what kind of pattern there is that fits into this case. You certainly haven't indicated one yet that does.

THE WITNESS: I don't know if the pattern is going to fit in this case. When I've testified in this way as an education witness, what the courts have said is I provide the educational material. Then it is up to the jury to decide, am I a credible witness, is the dynamics that I describe, do they seem to fit the evidence in this case. That decision is left for the jury.

THE COURT: Well, I understand all that. That's not what I'm asking you about. I'm still a little bit vague about what you're planning to say in the trial of this case.

THE WITNESS: Okay. Well, basically what I would do is first start to talk about a typology of sex offenders that I've developed, and essentially this is a continuum that ranges from what I call situational or opportunistic type sex offenders, down to the other end of the continuum, which is preferential sex

offenders who have true sexual preferences and are driven predominantly by sexual needs. And I can describe what those patterns are and what this continuum indicates and what behavior patterns and which type of offenders are more likely to engage in.

THE COURT: All right, do you want to ask him some questions? I'm not convinced he's telling me what I need to know, and I had in mind what he was going to say, but I'm not at all convinced that he's going to testify about, so I'm going to give you an opportunity to clarify that.

MS. THACKER: Yes, Your Honor.

EXAMINATION

BY MS. THACKER:

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- Q. Mr. Lanning, you mentioned patterns of behavior with respect to child sexual offenders that you would plan to testify about. Could you tell us some of the characteristics that you focus on or would testify about in connection with, for example, a preferential sex offender?
- A. Preferential sex offenders usually -- and, again, down at that end of the continuum, are individuals who operate as part of long-term and persistent patterns of behavior. So we tend to see longer patterns of behavior that go back further into their background.

A lot of their behavior tends to be what I would call need driven, and, that is, they engage in behaviors primarily because of a need that they have, a sexual need or other kind of

need that they have.

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They behave in certain kinds of ways that I've identified, or more likely to behave in those kinds of ways, and those offenders would be more of what I would call the preferential type of offender.

They may have a true sexual preference for children, or they may have other sex preferences that they carry out with children because the children are available, but they're motivated primarily by sexual needs.

- Q. And are there other characteristics with respect to preferential sex offenders, in addition to long-term and persistent pattern of behavior?
- 13 There's a whole list that I have in my publications that I've published, and I've used in my training of characteristics -of behavior patterns, I should say, is the correct term --16 behavior patterns that they tend to engage in.
 - Would you testify about the seduction or grooming process with respect to the child sexual offenders?
 - Yes. Although either offender can engage in grooming or seduction, we see it a little bit more often with preferential offenders, but a lot depends on what is the relationship between the offender and the victim.

If the offender and the victim are acquaintances -- in other words, they know each other -- the more likely to see this kind of grooming or seduction process, where the offender

- gradually seduces the victim over time with attention, affection, kindness, whatever needs they identify, they fill those needs in the child and manipulate the child into cooperating in the sexual
- Q. Are there particular -- is pornography used in terms of the sex offender?

activity.

- A. Yes, depending on who the victim is. Now, if you're going to try to seduce a three-year old girl, pornography may play no significant role in that, or a very minor role, but if you're going to try to seduce somebody who is a little bit older, then pornography can be a very important part of that seduction process.
 - Q. And would you testify, as well, with regard to well-developed techniques and what that may entail in preferential sex offenders or sex offenders along the continuum?
 - A. Yes. When you have an offender who's been doing this as part of a long term persistent pattern of behavior, they tend to develop good techniques of doing this. In order to get away with this for an extended period of time, they have to refine and develop their techniques, which they do through the process of doing this over an extended period of time. So they get good at what they're doing, which enables them to get away with it for a longer period of time.
 - Q. You mentioned the long and persistent pattern of behavior, are there characteristics that you see within that that you would

- testify about that are indicators of a long-term and persistent
 pattern of behavior?
 - A. Yes. Because I deal with patterns of behavior, what I've tried to develop is observable patterns that people -- investigators, prosecutors, other people -- can see that would tend to indicate that someone was engaging in those kinds of patterns.

So I have various kinds of indicators that I see, that I've developed in my experience and my training that tell us that an individual may be operating as a part of a long-term, persistent pattern of behavior.

Q. And what sorts of indicators are those?

- A. One of them obviously might be multiple victims, that if someone has been doing this for a long period of time, particularly against children, they're more likely to have multiple victims to -- as I said earlier -- to develop techniques in grooming these individuals, and so on, and things like that.
- Q. With respect to specific sexual interests, are there patterns of behavior that you've seen during the course of your experience that you would testify in that regard?
- A. Yes. In other words, if someone has a particular sexual interest, and we can identify it as part of their sexual need, something that's important for them to be aroused and gratified, then we would look for indicators that those needs were there, and they might involve material that the individual has collected,

material that he has in his possession.

- Q. What sorts of material that the individual would collect?
- A. Generally, any offender can collect sexually explicit material, but the more preferential offenders tend to collect obviously one type of material, which is pornography, which they find sexually arousing, stuff that they look at and get sexually aroused.

But they also may collect a lot of material that they use to rationalize and justify and validate their behavior to convince them that they're really caring, loving people in what they're doing with children. They have souvenirs and mementoes of their relationship with the children. They may save things that are part of their sexual relationship with the children.

- Q. And are there also rationalization behaviors involved in the characteristics with regard to child sexual offenders?
- A. Yes. And that's a very important thing for some offenders more than others, which is what my typology is all about, to understand that not all offenders are the same.

Some of them have a tremendous need to validate their behavior, and so they might collect letters from the victims, notes from the victims talking about how much they care about them and how wonderful they are in their lives and things like that. Any number of things. Or read articles and collect other material that tries to analyze or look at child victimization in a way different than how society generally or the law looks at it.

Q. Are there some rationalizations that would use culture or religious methodologies?

A. Obviously what I have found is the effective offender is going to look at the child, see what the needs of that child are, and then fill those needs. In other words, you find out what are the things that are more likely to work with that particular child.

And so the way you would groom and seduce a five-year old girl may be different than the way you would groom and seduce a 15 year-old boy. But part of it is identifying needs and vulnerabilities that they have, and the vulnerabilities could be cultural, religious, any number of things that you would plug into to manipulate that child for your purposes.

- Q. Is the role that an offender plays in the child's life significant in terms of the characteristics that you've studied?

 A. Yes. It's extremely important to at least look at the basic relationship between the offender and the child. Are we talking about a stranger, are we talking about an acquaintance, are we talking about a family member, and how you operate and what you do is going to depend a lot, if you want to get away with this crime, on your relationship with the child.
- Q. And have you also developed in the course of your experience characteristics or patterns of behavior with regard to the victims or the children?
- A. Yes. And this grows out of my work with offenders in that we understand how the different offenders operate, we then have to

understand and have insight into the victims.

And so if a child is grabbed by a stranger and forced into sexual activity, and then released, there's a good chance that that child is going to come home and immediately disclose.

If a child has been befriended and groomed and seduced by an acquaintance and gradually lured into this, their inhibitions lowered, showered with attention and affection and kindness, a bond develops between the victim.

The victim does many things that they are ashamed and embarrassed about. These victims very rarely then disclose and sometimes vehemently deny that they were victims, and very often, the word that I like to use, cooperate, or are compliant in their victimization.

They cannot consent in the legal sense of the word, because they're children, but they comply. And this is something that most people don't understand. We think that all children are suppose to say, no, yell, and tell.

Many children, depending on who the offender is, do not say no, they say, yes. They don't yell, they don't utter a sound, they don't tell anybody about it, and sometimes vehemently deny that it happened.

- Q. And what factors would go into this not telling or vehemently denying that it happened?
- A. A lot would depend on their relationship with the offender, whether they even consider themselves to be victims or not, the

amount of shame and embarrassment and guilt that they feel for having gone along with this. Many different factors enter into whether these children disclose this.

- Q. You mentioned that you've developed this typology of patterns of behavior of both sex offenders and compliant victims over the course of time. When did you develop these behavioral patterns with respect to offenders?
- A. My typology of offenders, I first published in 1986, '85, '86, or thereabouts, and began to incorporate it into my training and lecturing that I was doing all around the country and all around the world.

I then revised it four times. The current edition is my fourth edition. I published it through the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children. Many other individuals have duplicated it, and it's been published in many other publications as well.

So the typology, I basically first developed in the early to mid-80s, and continued to refine it as I go along. The concept of compliant victims is something that came a little bit later.

I recognized these dynamics, but understanding more specifically what was involved is something that came later in my career, and I first published that material, specific material about that in the early -- about 2002-2001.

But I had talked about certain aspects of it prior to

that and had published material about it. I just didn't use the 2 term "compliant child victim."

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- Q. And what are these behavioral characteristics in your typologies that you developed in 1986, forward, what are they based upon?
- They're based on my training, education, and experience. was assigned for the last 20 years of my FBI career and what most people know of as the FBI Behavioral Science Unit in Quantico.

And in that unit we did training, we did research, we looked at the research of others, and we were involved in case consultation.

So during that 20 years, I consulted on thousands of cases from all over the United States, all over the world. research at the unit with other members of the unit.

I interacted with other professionals in this field, looked at their research, and then got involved in training where I interacted with investigators, prosecutors, all kinds of professionals who deal with this and would get feedback from them.

- So it's not based on anything with regard to the particular case, but something that you developed prior to this case?
- 21 Yes. As I said, I have very little knowledge of this case.
- 22 All these patterns that I'm talking about are based on the 23 thousands of cases that I've been involved in, the training and
 - the research that I've done and received.
- And have you testified as an expert witness in this area 25

1 before?

- 2 A. Yes, I have.
- 3 Q. How many times?
- 4 A. It's in my resume, but I would say approximately somewhere in
- 5 the neighborhood of 35 to 45 times.
- 6 Q. Is that in both state and federal court?
- 7 A. Yes.
- 8 Q. And what did you testify as an expert about in particular?
- 9 A. A variety of different things, but other than maybe in two or
- 10 | three cases they all related in some way to the sexual
- 11 victimization of children, some aspect, either understanding
- 12 offender or victim patterns of behavior or certain roles that
- 13 | material played and so on.
- But it was all focused on some aspect of the sexual
- 15 | victimization of children other than, as I said, maybe two or
- 16 three cases where it was other areas.
- 17 | Q. You mentioned earlier, I think, a continuum of sex offender
- 18 behavior. What do you mean by that?
- 19 A. Well, one of the things I learned early on, I kind of talked
- 20 about the idea that there were two patterns of behavior, and what
- 21 I realized as I continue to learn and modify this over time was
- 22 | that it was better to look at human behavior along a continuum
- 23 rather than deciding everybody was either this or that, that we're
- 24 | looking at patterns of behavior, and it means that somebody is
- 25 more preferential or more situational, but you can have mixed

patterns of behavior.

- Q. You're talking about patterns of behavior with regard to the sex offenders; is that correct?
 - A. Yes, the patterns of behavior of the offenders.
- Q. You mentioned on one end of the continuum is the situational sex offender, on the other end of the continuum is the preferential sex offender. Can you tell us a little bit about what is meant by or the factors that you look at with regard to a situational sex offender?
 - A. Yes. The main thing that we look at in deciding is behavior. In other words, that's what I look at, is behavior, to try to say where someone fits along this continuum and what purpose that really serves. A lot of times it helps you to decide where they might be and what type of corroborative evidence.

But at the situational end of the continuum, these are offenders who tend to be more opportunistic, take advantage of certain situations and dynamics, tend to be more spontaneous, and so on, and opportunistic in their crimes, and we see certain patterns that we're more likely to see with this type of offender.

At the other end is the preferential offender, for whom it is part, as I said, of a long-term and persistent pattern of behavior, and there we see more kind of predictable patterns.

Q. With regard to -- in comparison to the situational offender at one end and the preferential sex offender at the other end, what has your experience told you with regard to their plan or in terms

of the process of using children?

A. Either individual, if they're going to get away from some period — going to get away with their crime for any period of time, they put some planning into it. What we see with situational offenders, they engage in more what people in law enforcement, investigators, are more familiar with, what's commonly referred to as MO; their modus operandi.

They develop things which work for them and facilitate them getting away with the crime. Preferential offenders certainly do that, and sometimes have those kinds of patterns, but they also have patterns that I call ritual, meaning these are need driven patterns -- need driven behaviors.

They do these things because of needs that they have, and the most common one with sex offenders is the need to get aroused and gratified. They may need to have a certain type of victim or certain types of sexual behavior.

- Q. With regard to the patterns that sexual offenders engage in focusing on particular victims, could you tell us a little bit more about what the grooming process means?
- A. Well, what -- the grooming process has to obviously be adjusted depending on what it is that you're trying to do and who you're trying to victimize, and so if you're talking about adults, then the grooming process usually results in non-criminal behavior.

If you seduce an adult, and they cooperate or consent,

then we usually don't have a crime. But if we're talking about children, the situational offender might not put as much time and effort into it, may be more opportunistic, he may take advantage of a certain situation that you're in.

Whereas the more preferential offender is more likely to commit a lot of time, energy, and resources to this, spend a lot of time doing this, developing children or victims over an extended period of time, including in some cases, starting to seduce them long before you plan to have sex with them.

- Q. Do you have a particular term for the development of children for a long period of time, one right after the other?
- A. Well, basically what I have found is that preferential offenders are more likely to be simultaneously involved with multiple children. They're not, in essence -- and maybe monogamous may be a poor term, but they -- frequently they don't take their victims one at a time; they're involved with multiple children, but depending on who the child is and how much access they have to the child.

Obviously if you're an acquaintance molester, one of the important things that you have is you have to find a method of access to the children, and so you have to develop that and then begin to develop your techniques based on that.

Q. With regard to the techniques in gaining access to the children, are there with respect to preferential sex offenders repeated methodologies with the victims?

- A. You mean in gaining access to them?
- Q. Yes.

A. Yes. What we've seen is the -- the three most common methods of access is sometimes a relationship with a woman who already has children. You can marry her, you can move in with her, you can be a boarder, but basically you take a woman who has children and then you befriend her, and then gain access to the children through her, through a relationship with this adult woman.

Sometimes is what we call neighborhood. You're just the nice guy in the neighborhood who has the kids come down to your house, you watch them, you babysit for them. So you just live in a neighborhood where there are a lot of children.

And the third method -- and none of these are mutually exclusive -- is some kind of a hobby, a vocation, or an occupation that gives you access to children. And so you may be a dentist, but you may specialize in treating children.

You could become a Boy Scout leader, a Little League coach, a minister that does youth work, and so on, any number of possibilities that you're trying to put yourself with access to children.

- Q. With respect to the individual children, are there specific methodologies, for example, in the seduction process, that the individual may use over and over with each victim as they come along?
- A. Yes. In other words, obviously these offenders are not super

human. They develop techniques, and they have their own personalities and skills. So they have to be what they are.

So depending on what abilities and skills that you have, if there are things that are working for you, and you're targeting certain types of victims, you may repeatedly use those things.

You may have to make some adjustments for each individual child, but there may be certain patterns that we see repeated from child to child, certain techniques that generally work, and the most common ones that work is showering these children with attention, affection, and kindness.

- Q. What about threats with regard to victims?
- A. There always can be threats, but particularly with the offender who grooms children, the so-called nice-guy molester, the most common time that they use threats is when the child wants to terminate this relationship, wants to leave before the offender is finished with the child, then they may threaten the child.

And the other time that threats become more common with this type of offender is when the relationship is ending. Now, you're going to terminate the relationship, you're pushing the child out the other end, and now you don't want this child to disclose. You've lost your close relationship with the child, so you may have to resort to threats at that point to keep the child quiet.

MS. THACKER: Your Honor, may I have a moment?
THE COURT: Sure.

BY MS. THACKER:

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- Q. Mr. Lanning, you've testified that you don't know the facts -much about the underlying facts of this case; is that correct?
- 4 A. That is correct.
- Q. Is that typical in your experience in terms of testifying as an expert witness?
 - A. I've done it both ways. I've been involved in many, many cases where I've been provided a great deal of material, records, discussions, all kinds of things, and asked to review it and analyze it and render some analysis or opinion about it.

And I've also been involved, particularly more recently, in cases where I've been what the courts seem to refer as an education witness, where I essentially know very little, if anything, about the case and just educate the court, the jury concerning certain patterns of behavior which most people are not otherwise aware of.

MS. THACKER: Your Honor, those are all the questions I have for Mr. Lanning.

THE COURT: All right, Mr. Garland.

EXAMINATION

21 BY MR. GARLAND:

- Q. Mr. Lanning, I'm Ed Garland. I'm examining you for the defense. First, I'd like to touch on your educational background.
- 24 You are not a psychologist, are you?
- 25 A. No, I am not.

- 1 | Q. Never had any training in psychology?
- 2 A. I had a lot of training in psychology, but I'm not a
- 3 psychologist.
- 4 Q. Did you go to school and take any courses in a college?
- 5 A. Yes, I did.
- 6 Q. And what college?
- 7 A. Sam Houston State University in Huntsville, I was in extension
- 8 at San Antonio at the time, and California Lutheran College in
- 9 Thousand Oaks, California, and then obviously my undergraduate
- 10 work many years ago, I had some classes on psychology.
- 11 | Q. Did you get a degree in psychology?
- 12 A. I did not get a degree in psychology, no.
- 13 | Q. And have you gotten any degree in psychiatry?
- 14 A. No, obviously not.
- 15 | Q. Have you ever worked in any clinical setting in the
- 16 | psychiatric setting?
- 17 A. No, I have not done clinical work.
- 18 | Q. Have you ever provided any counseling to an alleged offender,
- 19 sex offender?
- 20 A. No, I'm not qualified to do that.
- 21 Q. And have you ever participated with a psychiatrist in the
- 22 | analysis, diagnosis, and treatment of someone who has a sexual
- 23 deviancy problem?
- 24 | A. Yes.
- 25 Q. And when have you done that?

- 1 A. Many, many times over the years, although it was not my
- 2 | primary responsibility in the FBI, I primarily was servicing
- 3 | criminal justice professionals, but quite often I was contacted
- 4 either during training or at work by therapists, mental health
- 5 clinicians, who were looking for some advice and guidance to
- 6 better understand some patient that they were treating,
- 7 | evaluating, or whatever.
- 8 Q. You have talked to a clinician working with a person who had a
- 9 problem?
- 10 A. Yes.
- 11 Q. But you one on one have never done that?
- 12 A. No. I'm not qualified.
- 13 Q. You never had the one on one with a sexual offender.
- 14 A. No, I --
- 15 Q. -- insofar as providing them treatment?
- 16 A. Providing them treatment. Yes, I've had one on one with them,
- 17 | but not providing the treatment.
- 18 Q. Now, your typology that you developed, when was that
- 19 developed?
- 20 A. As I indicated earlier, it evolved over time. I first began
- 21 to put it together and published it around 1985, 1986.
- 22 Q. And if I understand it, this is -- is the term typology one
- 23 that you applied to sexual characteristics? Is that something
- 24 that kind of you came up with, sir?
- 25 A. No. I saw certain patterns of behavior in sex offenders, and

- 1 then I tried to find a way to make that practical and apply it to 2 different areas. People suggested to me that the most common term for that kind of a classification system was a typology, so I 3
- 5 Q. You called it a typology. And is that -- a typology is your way of referring to what you consider to be common 6 7 characteristics?

called it a typology.

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- Yes. It was a way to group together certain patterns of 8 9 behavior -- and that was my focus, behavior -- in some way that 10 could make sense.
 - Q. All right, so would the word "characteristics" be an equivalent? You said patterns of behavior, but when you say a pattern of behavior, this would be patterns of characteristics; is that correct?
 - A. I don't think -- correct. I prefer and try whenever possible -- I sometimes will lapse, and I will sometimes use the word characteristic, but a better word is patterns of behavior because what I focused on was behavior, not whether someone was, you know, immature or some other character -- a personality characteristic. What I was looking at is behaviors. Now, sometimes they overlap.
- to refer to what you refer to as the typology; is that right? I may have, and probably sometimes I have. Whenever possible, 25 whenever I can remind myself, I try to keep calling it the

Well, let's see. Sometimes you use the word characteristics

- patterns of behavior, but there may have been times I've used the word characteristics.
- Q. So we have behavior, and you have taken behavior and said that you -- you see a pattern?
- 5 A. Yes.
- Q. And then based on the pattern that you say you saw, you then wrote about and developed a descriptive criteria for these patterns of behavior, correct?
- 9 A. I think that that is a correct statement.
- Q. Okay. Now, and if I heard you correctly, you have continued based on your observation to modify your definitions or your work
- 12 in several different periods of time?
- 13 A. Yes. I continued to learn as I saw these cases, yes.
- 14 Q. Okay. Right. And your source of developing your patterns was
- 15 looking at other prosecutions; is that correct?
- 16 A. A small part of it, yes.
- Q. Okay. Now, your typologies or your patterns, have they ever been tested by any form of test or statistical study?
- 19 A. That is about to happen very shortly, but up til now, the only
- 20 way it has been tested is by the fact that it is used by thousands
- 21 of investigators all over this country on an almost daily basis,
- 22 but I have not done that type of empirical testing that you're
- 23 talking about.
- Q. I understand. It's about to be done. Now, how is going to be
- 25 done when it is done?

- I was contacted by a man who treats sex offenders who is part 2 of the American Association for Treatment -- ATSA -- Association
- 3 for Treatment Sex Abusers as a professional clinician who believed
- that my typology may be the most effective way to diagnose and 4
- 5 treat sex offenders, and so he has submitted a grant to have --
- 6 establish a design to basically use my typology in a way that I
- 7 didn't intend it, to use it for diagnostic and treatment purposes,
- 8 and to see how these individuals fit and whether a treatment
- program can be developed based on this type typology. 9
- 10 But up until this time, no statistical studies, to your
- knowledge, have been done to test your theory of patterning; 11
- 12 that's correct, isn't it?
- 13 Testing in what way? Α.
- 14 Well, in the way you just said is being proposed, that the
- 15 legitimacy -- the reliability of your conclusions have not been
- statistically tested in any fashion, have they? 16
- 17 In a formal academic way, not to my knowledge, no.
- 18 Okay. Now, do you have a field that you say you are an expert Q.
- 19 in?

- 20 I would say -- when people have asked me that question, I
- 21 would say that my major area of expertise is in the area of what I
- 22 prefer to call the sexual victimization of children, the
- 23 behavioral dynamics of the sexual victimization of children.
- 24 Q. Now, are there any societies in which people purport to be
- 25 simply situated as you, such as the Society for the purpose of

this?

A. I am a member of the American Professional Society on the Abuse of Children. I'm a founding member and a former member of their board, an advisory board, which is a multi-disciplinary group of individuals who deal with many of these issues. And I'm on the advisory board of the Association for Treatment of Sex Abusers.

- Q. All right, now, have your theories, your typologies been subjected to written peer review?
- A. I believe, yes. It depends on what your definition of peer review is.
 - Q. Okay, well, if you would illuminate us on where there has been any writing about the accuracy or inaccuracy of your theories?
 - A. My publication was first published by an organization called the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children. They published it, put their logo on it, printed it. Before they did that, they subjected it to more peer review than most professional journals get.

I peer review articles for professional journals all the time. Usually they get three people. They sent my manuscript to a lot more people than that who looked at it, evaluated it, decided whether it was professional and so on, and then they made the decision to publish it, and then made the decision to publish three revisions or new additions after that.

Q. Do you know who they sent it to?

- A. I don't have their names, no.
- Q. Did you ever see any writings of this --
- A. Yeah, they would come back to me quite often after they sent it out to different kinds of people. And you have to understand that my material was peer reviewed on many different levels, not just mental health or clinical, but from prosecutors, lawyers, investigators, various other professional disciplines, and they

And then when they would get these responses back, they would come back to me, and say, this is what the people who are peer reviewing your publication have mentioned, what do you think about this, can we make changes, and so on, and so forth.

- Q. So you've had observations from a lot of prosecutors?
- 14 A. Yes.

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15 Q. Okay. And policemen?

would look at it.

- 16 A. Yes.
- 17 Q. Now, have you ever submitted it to any association of psychiatrists for review?
 - A. I have not submitted it in a formal way to be published because it kind of already was published in the way that I wanted it to, but I have presented it many times, and in my vitae I list all the universities and scholarly groups and organizations that I've presented my typology to.
 - Q. All right, but you've never presented it for a peer review to any group of psychiatrists, have you?

- 1 A. Not to be published by them, no.
- 2 Q. Okay, and you've never submitted it to any group of
- 3 psychologists to be published by them, right?
- 4 A. No, I have not.
- 5 Q. And you're familiar from your study of psychology that it's
- 6 very common in professional psychology and in the testing of
- 7 | theories to do lots of statistical analysis; are you not? You're
- 8 familiar with that?
- 9 A. I'm familiar with that, yeah, right.
- 10 | Q. And those type of tests have not been done on your theories of
- 11 | the patterning of facts, have they?
- 12 A. That specific type of testing to the best of my knowledge has
- 13 | not been done.
- 14 Q. All right. Now, as I understand it, you developed an idea of
- 15 patterning of facts that facts are on a continuum. Is that -- as
- 16 | I hear you say that, I kind of envision a line, and at one end,
- 17 | it's one thing, and at one end, there's another, right?
- 18 | A. Well, basically when I try to explain a continuum, I simply
- 19 mean that it is not a choice between just two things; that you can
- 20 be along this continuum in a variety of places. You can be more
- 21 towards one end, more towards the other end.
- 22 | Q. If we are more toward the end, would it be correct to say that
- 23 this idea is something that is along a line, and that there are
- 24 different types, depending on where you are along this line?
- 25 A. The way you are along this line determines whether you're more

- 1 one thing or more the other, yes.
- 2 Q. And as I understand it, the line is composed of different
- 3 forms of, shall I just say, perverted sexual gratification; is
- 4 that right?
- 5 A. That's wrong.
- 6 Q. That's wrong. Some of it is not perverted?
- 7 A. Well, sometimes we're looking at perverted sexual activity,
- 8 | sometimes we're looking at lots of different things. We're just
- 9 looking at behavior patterns that we can identify that hopefully
- 10 tell us about criminal activity, which is my main focus from a law
- 11 enforcement background, what I'm looking at is criminal activity.
- 12 Whether something is perverted or not, I will leave for others to
- 13 decide. My main focus was on criminal sex activity.
- 14 | Q. Well, as I heard you say that patterns of behavior relates to
- 15 | sexual arousal, that's one of the things you look at.
- 16 A. That's one of the things I look at; if you can determine what
- 17 | somebody seems to be getting aroused by, what their sexual
- 18 preferences might be.
- 19 Q. So, if someone has sex with a child --
- 20 A. Yes.
- 21 Q. -- then you would say that they are aroused by having sex with
- 22 a child; is that right?
- 23 A. Generally speaking, but it's not quite that simple.
- 24 | Q. They can have sex without being aroused?
- 25 | A. Yes, sometimes they can. It depends on what your definition

- 1 of arousal is, but some people have a sex with children because
- 2 they have a sexual preference for children, and some people have
- 3 sex with children because they're weak, vulnerable, and available,
- 4 and may have to fantasize that this is someone else, but only the
- 5 child is available. These are all the variables that I look at in
- 6 studying a case.
- 7 Q. And yet, as I take it, you're saying that sometimes it would
- 8 be without sexual arousal that they would have sex?
- 9 A. Well, depending on what your definition of sexual arousal is.
- 10 If you're talking about a man having an erection, that's one
- 11 indicator, but sometimes you have individuals who may not have an
- 12 | erection, they may be doing things obviously in order to -- the
- 13 | issue here is that from a criminal justice point of view in
- 14 | evaluating these cases, you have to look at both the behavior and
- 15 | the motivation for that behavior.
- 16 Q. Well, I'm just asking to understand how you developed patterns
- 17 about sexual arousal, and if I understood you correctly, you said
- 18 that there could be patterns in which people had sex, but did not
- 19 get sexually aroused. Now, you said that, didn't you, a moment
- 20 ago?
- 21 A. I said that that's one pattern that I could look at.
- 22 Obviously in many of these cases the patterns are that they were
- 23 getting sexually aroused but it's not just sexual behavior that
- 24 | you're looking at.
- 25 | Q. Is there any form of sexual behavior that you wouldn't put in

a pattern involving a child?

- 2 A. That you -- well, I guess when you engage in behavior, the
- 3 | question is, are there patterns that seem to have some
- 4 consistency, or are they a more random. That's part of the
- 5 evaluation of what you're doing.
- 6 Q. Well, give us an example of some random patterns.
- 7 A. Well, basically maybe an indiv -- okay, I was involved in a
- 8 case one time when a man was over at a house watching a football
- 9 game with a friend who was living with this woman who had
- 10 children, and during the half time of the game her 12 year-old
- 11 | daughter walked in, and the friend asked this man if he'd like to
- 12 have sex with the daughter.
- He first indicated he didn't want to, and he said, why
- 14 not, she'd like to have it, and so he did, and during the half
- 15 | time he went in the back room and had sex with her. That's child
- 16 molesting, that's a crime, but that's not a preferential pattern
- 17 of behavior. As best we can figure out it was an isolated
- 18 incident to that time.
- 19 Q. So you're saying there's child molestation that's isolated,
- 20 and there's child molestation that's not isolated; is that
- 21 | correct?
- 22 A. That could be. And, again, it's a continuum.
- 23 Q. So a continuum really encompasses all of it --
- 24 A. We're looking --
- 25 Q. -- all forms of molestation?

- 1 A. Well, this is sex offenders. We're looking at sex offenders
- 2 along a variety of ways with --
- 3 Q. But I'm talking about sexual molestation. If I used the word
- 4 -- here it's talking about sexual molestation. I'm not talking
- 5 about physical abuse of some sort.
- 6 A. But when you say the word molestation, are you referring to
- 7 | the victimization of only children, or adults, or what are you
- 8 referring to?
- 9 Q. Well, let's say children.
- 10 A. Okay.
- 11 Q. Okay, so as it relates to children when you use the word
- 12 | continuum, you're talking about all forms of sexual molestation of
- 13 | children?
- 14 A. That's one thing that we look at on this continuum, yes.
- 15 \ Q. That's one thing. I'm talking about the continuum itself,
- 16 | what it consists of.
- 17 A. The continuum consists of a way to analyze the patterns of
- 18 behavior of an offender. Some of those patterns of behavior are
- 19 sexual in nature, and some of them are not.
- 20 Q. So you have created -- this is personally created by you,
- 21 correct?
- 22 A. Well, I developed it in conjunction with many other
- 23 professionals.
- 24 | Q. Okay. Now, the name "situational offender", did you -- at one
- 25 end of the continuum, did you create that name?

- 1 A. No, I did not.
- Q. Okay. And, "preferential" at the other end, did you create
- 3 that name?
- 4 A. No, I did not.
- 5 Q. Okay. Now, is there published definitions of preferential
- 6 sexual offender?
- 7 A. I have published what I mean by the terms, and I have
- 8 referenced where other people have used similar terms, other
- 9 mental health professionals, and I've made reference to those
- 10 places.
- 11 Q. So the definition of it, is it one that you created?
- 12 A. The definition that I use, I defined it, I created it based on
- 13 the work of myself and other professionals in the field.
- 14 | Q. And the term you use as "situational" is that a term that you
- 15 | created?
- 16 A. I didn't create the term. I had a pattern that I identified.
- 17 I discussed it with psychiatrists, mental health people. I was
- 18 referred to material where there was a word -- I was looking for
- 19 descriptive term. I didn't want to use any diagnostic terms, and
- 20 | somebody suggested that as a good descriptive term, so I used it,
- 21 and then defined it in my writings.
- 22 | Q. All right, now, have you ever participated in work with
- 23 | children?
- 24 A. What do you mean by work with children?
- 25 | Q. Have you ever worked with children?

- A. In a paying job, is that what you're talking about or --
- Q. Yes, in any paying job ever worked with children?
- 3 A. Other than doing some presentations and teaching where there
- 4 | were children in the audience. I don't know whether that's what
- 5 | you're referring to.
- 6 Q. Well, I mean, have you ever participated in any kind of
- 7 | studies of the reaction of children to different stimuli?
- 8 A. No, I have not done that, no.
- 9 Q. So you have no one-on-one experience about how children react
- 10 to different suggestions, do you? One-on-one from conducting any
- 11 kind of clinical experiment or otherwise as to how they will
- 12 react?

- 13 A. I'm not sure what you mean when you say one-on-one. I have
- 14 experience, much experience dealing with these dynamics from an
- 15 | investigator point of view because I was an FBI agent. I was not
- 16 | a clinician. So I've dealt with many, many cases where we're
- 17 | looking at how an individual child reacted and issues of leading
- 18 and suggestion and all these kinds of things.
- 19 Q. You have studied cases that have been presented, but what I'm
- 20 | asking you about is, have you ever done any educational analysis
- 21 | where you were in any kind of clinical or classroom settings where
- 22 different techniques of persuasion or seduction were used or
- 23 attempted to be used on any children?
- 24 A. Well, first of all, I do not know how you could ever possibly
- 25 do that. That would be one of the most unethical things you could

- ever do in a classroom setting to seduce children. I don't know anybody would be allowed to do that.
- Q. All right, then, have you participated in any studies where suggestibility has been studied and techniques of suggestibility, to suggest to children conduct?
- A. I have not participated in those studies directly, but I've worked with people who do those studies.
- 8 Q. And there are studies to that effect; are there not?
- 9 A. Yes, there are.
- 10 Q. Now, seductions of children, based on your studies, have
 11 occurred in literally hundreds of different techniques; isn't that
 12 correct?
- 13 A. Well, I don't know what you mean when you say in hundreds of different techniques.
- Q. Well, let me be clearer then. You have studied seduction that has taken place by people using hundreds of different techniques to seduce; have you not?
- 18 A. I don't know what -- well, that would be a difficult question.
- 19 I've never counted how many different techniques because I'm not 20 sure what constitutes a different technique.
- Q. Well, are there different techniques -- if you're not sure, are there different techniques of seductions of children?
- A. I would say the best answer to that is, do men seduce women using different techniques. And the answer is they have different techniques. There may be common patterns to those techniques, but

- there can be variations. You just have to decide whether a
 different variation constitutes a different technique. There are
 certain basic commonalities in all the techniques, but they can
- 4 have variations.
- Q. So your answer is that the way men seduce women or induce women into sex are as varied as there are men and women.
- A. I think that the patterns -- there's some commonalities to the patterns, but there can be variations based on individual traits.
- 9 Q. Well, I mean, obviously one of the patterns is it involves
 10 sex. That would be a common pattern, wouldn't it?
- A. But we're talking about something that primarily precedes the sex. We're not talking about the sex itself. Now, we're talking about what leads up to getting the person to go along with the sex.
- Q. So whatever men do to seduce women, you would compare that to what adults do to seduce children.
- A. I would only compare it insofar as to help people to
 understand it, but there is no comparison because men and woman
 seducing each other who are adults is called dating, and it's not
 criminal. Adults doing this to children is called child
 molestation. It's not the same.
- MR. GARLAND: Just a moment, please, Your Honor.

 THE COURT: All right.
- 24 BY MR. GARLAND:
- 25 Q. In determining whether there has been molestation, you focus

- 1 on the fact of what the conduct was, correct?
- 2 A. From my criminal justice background, what I have learned in
- determining whether molestation took place, I prefer to focus on
- 4 | every bit of information I can get my hands on.
- 5 Q. Well, I believe you said that your topology, or your
- 6 patterning, was done by focusing on facts. You testified to that,
- 7 | did you not, sir?
- 8 A. I develop my typology based on allegations and information
- 9 that I had, that I had to assess and evaluate the accuracy of it,
- 10 and then build my typology on that information, yes, right.
- 11 Q. That information being facts?
- 12 A. Hopefully, yes.
- 13 Q. And so the facts determine whether there was molestation,
- 14 | correct?
- 15 A. Well, the problem that's confusing here is that my typology is
- 16 | not just simply based on the sexual behavior. That seems to be
- 17 | what you're focusing on, only on the sexual acts. I'm talking
- 18 about a whole range of behavior, before, during, and after the
- 19 sexual activity.
- 20 Q. All right, and the molestation is based on what you find from
- 21 the facts, both before, during, and after, whether or not there
- 22 | was molestation?
- 23 A. Whether or not there was molestation is something that the
- 24 courts decide. I don't decide. I try to develop a typology that
- 25 | would assist investigators and prosecutors and other fact-finders

- to evaluate that information and attempt to determine whether or not a child was or was not molested.
- Q. Well, you have talked about -- you have said facts give rise to patterns, right?
- 5 A. I didn't say that.
- 6 Q. Okay. They don't give rise to patterns.
- 7 A. I said the facts can be analyzed to see if there are patterns.
- 8 Q. Okay, so whether they fit a certain profile, correct?
- 9 A. I don't know what you're talking about profile. There's no
- 10 | profile here. What I do is look at certain behaviors and decide
- 11 whether there are any patterns in that behavior.
- 12 Q. All right, and so the patterns, if we had a pattern, and it
- 13 | had several characteristics to it, that would be the profile of
- 14 | that pattern; would it not?
- 15 A. I wouldn't call it a profile, no.
- 16 | Q. Why not?
- 17 A. Because that's not how I use the word profile.
- 18 | Q. What does profile mean to you?
- 19 A. Profile means to me a personality description of an unknown
- 20 subject who has committed a crime. That's what I call a profile.
- 21 Q. Okay, they'd be unknown. And if they became known, would they
- 22 still have the same profile in your definition?
- 23 A. A profile is a description of an unknown subject. Once they
- 24 | become known, then they're not unknown anymore, and there is no
- 25 | more profile.

- Q. And so you couldn't produce a profile for a known subject, could you?
 - A. Not the way I define a profile, no. I could tell you his name and address and everything. It's not a profile anymore.
- Q. Okay, so it is something that you say has certain characteristics then, but you won't designate it as a term "profile?"
 - A. It's not a profile. What I'm saying is that I take certain behavior patterns, information that you learn from the case, you assess them and evaluate them and decide how accurate they are, and then you try to see where they fit and what purpose that serves in analyzing the case in trying to become a fact-finder.
 - Q. And you haven't done that in this case by analyzing the specific facts of this case, have you?
 - A. No, I have not, no.

- MR. GARLAND: I have nothing further, Your Honor.
- MS. THACKER: Nothing else, Your Honor, aside from argument.
 - THE COURT: Well, I think I'm going to give the defense the opportunity to submit something to me, so we don't have to have any argument about it right now. That's my plan, I mean, Mr. Garland, you certainly --
- MR. GARLAND: No, I would prefer to do a submission, Your Honor.
 - THE COURT: Well, let me give you a few thoughts about

this, again, to point out what I think is important so you can address these matters along with what I said earlier about the case, and the fact the Frazier case may be withdrawn, doesn't change my opinions that I've stated earlier about the focus of my inquiry in this particular situation.

And I would just refer you to the <u>Kumo Tire</u> case which is one of the big three cases that came out of the Supreme Court, and it says in talking about the Daubert gate-keeping requirement; that the objective of that requirement is to insure the reliability and relevancy of expert testimony; it is to make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience or is in the courtroom, the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field (reading).

Now, this man has testified about considerable personal experience in dealing with this area. He's also testified about considerable training in this area. He's also testified that he's published in this area, and that, in fact, it was extensively peer reviewed.

I also understand from what he's testified to that he has developed this typology, and the whole proposition in my mind turns on the validity of this typology and how he developed it.

That's why I say I'm not -- the conclusions, I don't think I'm suppose to deal with that.

But my understanding is that he developed this typology

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fields that have impact in this area, that over the course of the years since 1988 -- or when was it?

in conjunction with others in his field and people in related

1985, '86. THE WITNESS:

THE COURT: -- 1985, that he has presented this typology to various groups, some of which I understand to be scholarly groups and some which I understand to be clinical groups and obviously law enforcement groups, too, and that you've made adjustments to your typology over the years, and apparently also someone either at the academic level or the clinical level has taken this typology seriously enough to -- do I understand to get a grant in order to --

THE WITNESS: From the National Institute of Mental Health, he has applied for a grant to apply this for diagnostic and treatment purposes.

THE COURT: All right. And it's also clear to me that the methodology that applies in this situation is the methodology of behavioral sciences, which is certainly different from the methodologies that would be used by a physicist or a chemist, and certainly would be a situation where these kind of things can't be reproduced in the laboratory.

So those are what I have gleaned from what the witnesses have to say, and you can address those for me in the motion, and then I'll give you the opportunity to respond to that. Thank you.

> Thank you, Your Honor. THE WITNESS:

THE COURT: Okay, does anybody have any other questions related to any of the matters that we've dealt with today?

MR. PATRICK: Your Honor, I have one issue, not related to the matter, just a practical issue related to the defendant's placement in terms of preparation for trial. But in terms of the motions, Your Honor, no. I just have a request to make in terms of where he will be housed.

He's in Jones County now. I was just trying to see if he can remain there until we're close to the trial, because I think it's terribly inconvenient to drive back and forth, you know, down from -- I'm not sure where --

THE COURT: Yes, I don't think he'll be moved until shortly before the trial, and that's --

MR. PATRICK: I was just wondering could the court like maybe we could have the marshals because it'd just be too difficult. -

THE COURT: I certainly understand that concern.

MR. PATRICK: All right, thank you very much.

THE COURT: And I don't think that he's -- there's any plan to move him until shortly before the trial of the case. All right.

MR. PATRICK: Your Honor, if that happens, I can just inform you, and we can make some arrangements for him to stay there if there's any attempt shown for that to happen?

THE COURT: Well, the marshal is sitting right behind

1	you, and he understands; he's been nodding his head the whole time
2	so he understands.
3	MR. PATRICK: I didn't see him, Your Honor, but
4	THE COURT: I understand, I know, but okay, anything
5	else?
6	MR. PATRICK: No, Your Honor.
7	THE COURT: Mr. Garland.
8	MR. GARLAND: No, Your Honor.
9	THE COURT: All right.
10	(PRETRIAL HEARING CONCLUDED)
11	
12	CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER I, SALLY L. GRAY, Official Court Reporter of the
13	United States District Court, in and for the Middle District of the State of Georgia, do hereby CERTIFY that the foregoing is a
14	correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
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